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Abstract
We study dynamic contracting with adverse selection and limited commitment. A
rm (the principal) and a worker (the agent) interact for potentially innitely many
periods. The worker is privately informed about his productivity and the rm can
only commit to short-term contracts. The ratchet e¤ect is in place since the rm has
the incentive to change the terms of trade and o¤er more demanding contracts when
it learns that the worker is highly productive.
As the parties become arbitrarily patient, the equilibrium outcome takes one of
two forms. If the prior probability of the worker being productive is low, the rm
o¤ers a pooling contract and no information is ever revealed. In contrast, if this prior
probability is high, the rm res the unproductive worker at the very beginning of
the relationship.
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1 Introduction
Private information is pervasive in long-run relationships. Information revelation enhances
e¢ ciency as it helps in nding the best plans of action. However, parties involved in
long-run relationships often fear that revealing their private information may worsen their
future terms of trade. This problem is aggravated when the privately informed party (the
agent) contracts with a party with a stronger bargaining position (the principal). These
relationships are thus shaped by the principals desire to elicit information and the agents
reluctance to reveal it.
The phenomenon above, known as the ratchet e¤ect, is present in several real-life situ-
ations. Roy (1952) presents evidence that under the piece-rate system rms often worsen
the workersterms of trade after good performance. Similarly, Litwack (1991) documents
how planners with small commitment power would use past outputs to establish future
production targets and future managerial compensation, and explains its detrimental e¤ect
on incentives.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the ratchet e¤ect by analyzing an innite
horizon contracting problem with short-term contracts. We consider the relationship be-
tween a worker and a rm as our main interpretation. In each period, the worker can
produce a good of quality q 2 [0; 1] at a cost that is linear in q. At the outset of the
relationship, the worker is privately informed about his (persistent) marginal cost, which
can be either low or high. We let p0 denote the prior probability that the workers cost is
low. The rm can only commit to short-term contracts which indicate the payment that
the worker is entitled to receive, in the current period, if he turns in a good of a certain
specied quality. In each period in which the worker is employed, the rm o¤ers a menu
with nitely many contracts. Upon being o¤ered a menu, the worker can either accept one
contract in the menu or reject all contracts and end the relationship.
We show that when the discount factor is not too high the rm is able to extract the
workers private information independently of the value of the prior. In particular, if the
prior p0 is large the rm o¤ers a ring menu in every period. A ring menu contains only
one contract which species the e¢ cient quality when the cost is low and yields a payo¤
equal to zero to the worker. The contract is accepted only by the low-cost worker. Thus,
the rm learns the workers cost in the rst period by ring the high-cost worker.
When the prior is not too large, the rm employs a sequentially screening procedure.
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The rm starts o¤ering two contracts until it discovers the workers cost, which happens
in nitely many periods. During the screening procedure, the high-cost worker accepts
the rst contract while the low-cost worker randomizes between the two contracts. Once
the screening is complete and the rm discovers the cost, the worker delivers the e¢ cient
quality and obtains zero payo¤.
When the parties are su¢ ciently patient, the sequentially screening procedure described
above is not feasible. To see why, consider the last period of the screening procedure in
which the rm o¤ers a menu that fully separates the two types of worker (in the sense
that they accept two di¤erent contracts with probability one). However, for large discount
factors, this is not possible. Indeed if there were separation, the low-cost worker could
guarantee a large future payo¤ by mimicking the high-cost worker. Because of this it
impossible to design two contracts that simultaneously satisfy the truthtelling constraints
of the two types of worker. The low-cost worker can be prevented from imitating the high-
cost worker only if the contract designed for him is very generous. But in this case the
high-cost worker has an incentive to adopt the take the money and run strategy (i.e.,
accept the contract designed for the low-cost worker and then quit the relationship).1
The rm could, in principle, adopt more complex dynamic screening strategies. For
instance, it could start o¤ering menus in which di¤erent contracts are accepted with positive
but di¤erent probabilities by both types of workers and then use this information in later
periods to induce partial separation or even complete separation (through a ring menu).
To investigate the feasibility and optimality of such strategies, we analyze the limiting
outcome, as the parties become arbitrarily patient, of all perfect Bayesian equilibria.
We show that the limiting equilibrium outcome is unique and takes a very simple form.
If the prior is below a certain threshold p^; then, in every period, the rm o¤ers the most
protable contract that the high-cost worker is willing to accept. Both types of worker
accept the contract (i.e., they pool) and there is no learning. In contrast, if the prior is
above p^; the rm o¤ers the ring menu and the high-cost worker quits the relationship
without delay. In both cases, the limiting equilibrium allocation is ine¢ cient.
Our results show that when the parties are su¢ ciently patient, the rm loses the ability
to screen the worker without ring him when his cost is high. The driving forces behind
our ndings are similar to those which prevent full separation. When the discount factor
is large, it is very costly for the rm to separate the two types of worker and continue the
1This result is reminiscent of La¤ont and Tirole (1988).
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relationship with both of them. A lasting relationship with the high-cost worker provides
strong incentives to the low-cost worker to misrepresent his information. Using this fact,
we show that the rm would not benet from separating without ring even if this form of
separation were feasible.
Our benchmark model assumes that the relationship ends automatically when the
worker rejects all the contracts in the rms menu. This modeling assumption captures
situations in which upon disagreement the worker nds another job and becomes unavail-
able for the rm. Of course, one can also imagine situations in which the unemployed
worker remains available to be rehired in the future. We therefore analyze an extension
of the model that allows for rehiring. We study the innitely repeated game in which, in
each period, the rm proposes a menu of contracts from which the worker has to select
at most one. We rst show that the complete-information version of this game admits a
folk theorem. Although the rm has the bargaining power to make o¤ers, the worker can
obtain large payo¤s by credibly committing to reject unfavorable contracts. This is possi-
ble because the acceptance of unfavorable contracts by the worker triggers a continuation
equilibrium in which the rm implements an e¢ cient allocation that yields a zero payo¤
to the worker. We use these ndings from the complete-information game to show that
a version of the folk theorem holds for our model with rehiring.2 In particular, when the
parties are su¢ ciently patient, the rm can obtain a payo¤ arbitrarily close to the payo¤
of the optimal mechanism with commitment. These ndings suggest that the labor-market
structure may play an important role in the dynamics of incentive contracts.
This paper belongs to the literature on repeated adverse-selection with limited com-
mitment pioneered by Freixas, Guesnerie, and Tirole (1985), Gibbons (1987), and La¤ont
and Tirole (1987, 1988). In these seminal papers, the parties interact for two periods.
One of the main ndings is that there is partial separation of the agents types in the rst
period (i.e., the equilibrium is semi-pooling) and full separation in the second and nal
period. Therefore the outcome of two-period environments presents gradual information
revelation. In contrast, our paper shows that when the relationship is innitely repeated
and the prior is low, the equilibrium allocation is close to a pooling allocation when the
parties are patient.
Hart and Tirole (1988) analyze a dynamic model in which the seller makes a rental o¤er
2This nding is reminiscent of earlier contributions to repeated games with incomplete information and
simultaneous moves (see P¾eski (2008) and the references therein).
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to the buyer in every period. The buyers valuation for the good is private information
and can take two values, both of which are larger than the sellers cost of producing the
good. As the parties become su¢ ciently patient, the equilibrium allocation converges to the
e¢ cient allocation in which both types of buyer consume the good in every period. Note
that for large values of the probability of the low valuation, this pooling allocation coincides
with the sellers optimal mechanism under full commitment (i.e., lack of commitment is
not detrimental to the sellers payo¤). In a recent paper, Beccuti and Möller (2018) extend
Hart and Tiroles analysis to the case in which the seller is more patient than the buyer.
Halac (2012) studies a relational contract model in which the principal is privately informed
about his outside option. When the uninformed party has the bargaining power, Coasian
forces lead to a pooling outcome when the parties are su¢ ciently patient. Our work di¤ers
from these papers in two respects. First, in our model, the agents private information
is necessary to determine the best course of action and, therefore, pooling allocations are
never optimal for the rm under full commitment. Second, we analyze environments in
which the ratchet e¤ect leads to ine¢ ciencies.3
Our work is also related to the literature on renegotiation. The seminal paper by La¤ont
and Tirole (1990) analyzes a two-period model. Recently, Strulovici (2017) and Maestri
(2017) study renegotiation in innite horizon models. These studies nd that equilibrium
allocations become e¢ cient as the parties become arbitrarily patient. In contrast, in our
model the limit allocation is ine¢ cient whenever the ring allocation is not a commitment
solution.
Bhaskar (2014) studies learning in a dynamic model in which the principal and the agent
are ex-ante symmetrically informed about the jobs di¢ culty. When the agents e¤ort is
unobservable, it is impossible for the principal to design a contract that induces an interior
e¤ort level in the rst period. Bhaskar and Mailath (2017) consider a related dynamic
model and show that inducing high e¤ort becomes prohibitively costly for the principal
as the parties become arbitrarily patient. Therefore, the ratchet e¤ect imposes stringent
constraints on the learning process of the relationship. In contrast, our paper assumes
adverse-selection and no exogenous learning and concludes that the ratchet e¤ect imposes
constraints on the amount of private information that is revealed in a dynamic relationship.
3Our work analyzes the relationship between two innitely lived players. In the context of political econ-
omy, several papers study the e¤ects of limited commitment in repeated interactions between one principal
and a continuum of privately informed agents (see, among others, Acemoglu, Golosov, and Tsyvinski
(2010), Farhi, Sleet, Werning, and Yeltekin (2012), and Scheuer and Wolitzky (2016)).
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There is also a connection between our paper and the literature on durable goods
monopoly under limited commitment. Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) study a model in
which the seller posts prices and obtain a folk theorem for the no gap case. In our
context a folk theorem holds when rehiring is possible. Skreta (2006, 2015) analyzes more
general selling mechanisms and shows that posting a price is the sellers optimal strategy.
Of course, in these studies the relationship between the buyer and the seller ends as soon
as the durable good is traded, while in our model the parties can make a new transaction
in every period.
Finally, a number of authors have identied situations in which the ratchet e¤ect is
mitigated. Kanemoto and MacLeod (1992) argue that competition for secondhand work-
ers guarantees the existence of e¢ cient piece-rate contracts in long-term relationships.
Carmichael and MacLeod (2000) show that if entry in a market is di¢ cult, then it is pos-
sible to sustain cooperation between an innitely lived rm and a stream of short lived
worker. Our ndings suggest that rehiring is another possible remedy to the ratchet e¤ect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the model in Section 2. In
Section 3, we briey discuss the mechanism design problem with commitment. In Section 4
we show existence of equilibria and provide conditions under which all private information
is revealed. Section 5 contains the main result which completely characterizes the unique
equilibrium outcome when the parties are arbitrarily patient. In Section 6, we analyze the
extension of the model in which rehiring is possible. Section 7 concludes. Most proofs are
relegated to a number of appendices.
2 The Model
We study a dynamic principal-agent model with adverse selection and short-term contracts.
We interpret the model as the relationship between a rm and a worker.
The worker has private information about his (persistent) type, which is equal to L
with prior probability p0 2 (0; 1) ; and equal to H with probability 1 p0: The rm and the
worker interact for potentially innitely many periods. In each period, the worker of type
i = H;L can produce a good of quality q 2 [0; 1] at the cost iq; where 0 < L < H : We
refer to the low type L (high typeH) as the low (high) cost worker. We write := H L.
The worker bears an additional cost  > 0 in every period in which he interacts with the
rm. The cost  can be interpreted as the per-period payo¤ of an outside option available
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to the worker if he ends the relationship.
The rms valuation of a good of quality q is v (q) : The function v : [0; 1]! R+ is twice
continuously di¤erentiable, increasing, strictly concave, and satises v (0) = 0:4
Both partiespreferences are linear in money. When the worker produces a good of
quality q and the rm makes a transfer equal to x; the payo¤ of type i = H;L is x iq ;
while the rms payo¤ is v (q)  x:
We let qi ; i = H;L; denote the e¢ cient quality produced by type i :
qi = arg max
q2[0;1]
(v (q)  iq)
To make the problem interesting, we assume
v (qH)  HqH    > 0
This assumption guarantees that the rm prefers hiring the high-cost worker over col-
lecting its outside option, which yields a payo¤ equal to zero. Moreover, we assume that
qH 2 (0; 1) and, therefore qL > qH :5 In this case, the e¢ cient allocation varies with the
workers type.
The rm and the worker play the following game. At the beginning of period t =
0; 1; : : : ; the rm o¤ers a menu mt of contracts to the worker. Each contract is of the form
(xt; qt) and species the transfer xt paid by the rm and the quality qt 2 [0; 1] that the
worker must produce. We assume that the quality is veriable and, thus, each contract
is enforceable. After receiving the menu mt; the worker has two options: (i) selecting a
contract from the menu; (ii) rejecting all the contracts and quitting the relationship. In
the rst case, the game moves to the next period t+ 1. In the second case, the game ends
and both parties obtain a continuation payo¤ equal to zero. The parties discount future
payo¤s at the common discount factor  2 (0; 1) :
We letM =
[M
j=1
(R [0; 1])j denote the set of available menus, whereM 2 f2; 3; : : :g
is the exogenous largest number of contracts that a menu can contain. The restriction
4The concavity of v () guarantees that the rms screening problem in the proof of Proposition 1 is well
behaved. The concavity also allows us to derive a number of useful bounds in the proof of Proposition 2.
Finally, the assumption v0 (0) <1 implies that for large values of the prior, the solution to the mechanism
design problem with commitment is to re the high type (see Section 3). This is used in the proof of the
main result.
5In particular, we use this assumption in the proof of Proposition 1 to construct a sequence of separating
contracts.
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M > 2 guarantees that the menus can contain two contracts (so that it is possible for the
rm to separate the two types of worker). When the rm o¤ers the menu mt; the set of
actions available to the worker is mt [ f;g ; where ; denotes the choice of rejecting all the
contracts in mt and quitting. We let at denote the agents decision in period t:
For every t = 1; 2; : : : ; a period-t (non-nal) public history ht = (m0; a0; : : : ;mt 1; at 1)
consists of all the menus o¤ered by the rm in previous periods  = 0; : : : ; t   1, as well
as all the workers decisions, provided that he never chose to quit (i.e., a 6= ; for every
 = 0; : : : ; t   1). We let H0 = fh0g denote the set containing the empty history h0: We
write H t for the set of all period-t public histories. Finally, H = [t=0;1;:::H t is set of all
(non-nal) public histories.
A behavior strategy F for the rm is a sequence

Ft
	
, where Ft is a function from H
t
into (M), mapping the history ht into a (possibly random) menu. A behavior strategy 
H ; L

for the worker is a sequence
 
Ht ; 
L
t
	
; where it; i = H;L; associates to every
pair (ht;mt) 2 H t M a probability distribution over the set mt [ f;g : We write  = 
F ; H ; L

for a strategy prole. Finally, we let  = f (ht) ;  (ht;mt)ght2H;mt2M denote
the rms system of beliefs, where  (ht) ( (ht;mt)) represents the probability that the
rm assigns, at the history ht (ht;mt), to the event that the workers type is equal to L:
Our solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE or equilibrium henceforth),
formally dened below.
Denition 1 A PBE of our game is a strategy prole  and a system of beliefs  such
that:
i)  is sequentially rational given ;
ii) for every history (ht;mt) 2 H t M;  (ht;mt) =  (ht) ;
iii) for every (ht;mt) 2 H t M and for every at 2 mt [ f;g ; if 
1    ht Ht  atjht;mt+   htLt  atjht;mt > 0
then the belief  (ht;mt; at) is derived from  (ht) according to Bayesrule:

 
ht;mt; at

=
 (ht)Lt (atjht;mt)
(1   (ht))Ht (atjht;mt) +  (ht)Lt (atjht;mt)
In addition to sequential rationality and Bayesian updating whenever possible (i.e.,
including o¤-path histories (ht;mt; at) that are reached with positive probability given
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(ht;mt)), the concept of PBE imposes the no signaling what you dont knowcondition
(Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)) in the sense that the rm does not revise its belief after
proposing a menu.
Given a strategy prole  and a system of beliefs , for each history ht we let VF (ht; (; ))
denote the rms continuation payo¤ at ht. We also let T 2 N [ f1g denote the random
period in which the relationship terminates (we set T =1 if the worker remains employed
forever). Then we have:
VF (h
t; (; )) := E(;)
"
(1  )
T 1X
=t
 t (v(q )  x ) j ht
#
where E(;)[Y jht] represents the conditional expected value (given ht) of the random vari-
able Y given the strategy prole  and the system of beliefs . Analogously, for every
history ht we let Wi(ht; (; )) denote the expected continuation payo¤ at ht of the worker
of type i = H;L: We have:
Wi
 
ht; (; )

:= E(;)
"
(1  )
T 1X
=t
 t (x   iq   ) j i; ht
#
Here and in what follows, we useN = f0; 1; : : :g to denote the set of nonnegative integers
and adopt the convention that
Xt 1
=t
 t = 0:
To simplify the notation, we omit the argument (; ) and write VF (ht) and Wi(ht)
when there is no ambiguity. We also use VF (ht;mt) and Wi(ht;mt); i = H;L; to denote
the rm and workers payo¤ at the history (ht;mt) :
For i = H;L; and q 2 [0; 1] ; we let
i (q) := v (q)  iq   
denote the rms prots when the quality is q; the worker is of type i and the rm pays
the reservation wage iq + . Therefore, i (qi ) represents the highest level of prots that
the rm can achieve from the interaction with type i: Clearly, L (qL) > H (q

H) ; and we
let p^ 2 (0; 1) be dened by H (qH) = p^L (qL) :
We conclude this section with a simple result that provides a lower bound to the rms
payo¤ under any PBE.
Lemma 1 Fix a PBE (; ). For every history ht 2 H, we have:
VF (h
t; (; )) > max

H (q

H) ; 
 
ht

L (q

L)
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Proof of Lemma 1.
By contradiction, suppose that there exist a PBE (; ), a history ht, and " > 0 such
that
VF (h
t; (; )) < max

H (q

H) ; 
 
ht

L (q

L)
	  "
Suppose that H (qH) >  (h
t)L (q

L) : If the rm o¤ers the menu
 
Hq

H + +
"
2
; qH
	
in every period t; t+ 1; : : : (notice that both types strictly prefer to accept the contract in
the menu rather than quit the relationship), then its continuation payo¤ will be equal to
H (q

H) 
"
2
> VF (h
t; (; ))
which is a contradiction.
Similarly, if H (qH) 6  (ht)L (qL) ; the rm can guarantee a continuation payo¤ at
least equal to

 
ht
 
L (q

L) 
"
2

> VF (h
t; (; ))
by o¤ering the menu
 
Lq

L + +
"
2
; qL
	
in every period t; t+ 1; : : : (in equilibrium, the
low type must accept the contract in the menu). 
Intuitively, the following two options are always available to the rm. The rst option
is to stop learning and o¤er (HqH + ; q

H) ; the most protable contract in the class of
contracts that are accepted by both types of worker. The second option is to re the high-
cost worker and interact only with the low-cost worker. In this case, the most protable
contract is (LqL + ; q

L) :
3 The Commitment Allocation
It is useful to start the analysis by quickly reviewing the benchmark model in which the rm
can fully commit to a sequence of menus (m0;m1; : : :) : This provides an upper bound to
the rms prots in the game with limited commitment. It is well known that the solution
to the rms commitment problem is to replicate the optimal static mechanism (see, for
example, Chapter 1 in La¤ont and Tirole, 1993).
The optimal static mechanism takes two slightly di¤erent forms depending on whether
 = 0 or  > 0. First, assume that  = 0: In this case, there exists a critical value
pC 2 (p^; 1) such that if the prior p0 is weakly larger than pC ; then the optimal menu (with
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commitment) is unique and equal to f(LqL + ; qL)g :6 The low-cost worker accepts the
contract in the menu while the high-cost worker rejects it. Thus, the rms prots are equal
to p0L (qL) :
On the other hand, if p0 < pC ; then the unique optimal menu is 
xCH ; q
C
H

;
 
xCL ; q
C
L
	
=
 
Hq
C
H + ; q
C
H

;
 
Lq

L +q
C
H + ; q

L
	
(1)
for some qCH 2 (0; qH) : The high-cost worker accepts the rst contract and obtains a payo¤
equal to zero. The low-cost worker is indi¤erent between the two contracts (therefore, he
obtains a payo¤ equal to qCH) and accepts the second contract. In this case, the rms
commitment prots are equal to:
p0

v (qL)  LqL  qCH   

+ (1  p0)

v
 
qCH
  HqCH    :
We now turn to the case  > 0: As in the rst case, there exists a critical value of the
prior pC 2 (0; 1) : If p0 > pC the optimal mechanism is unique and equal to f(LqL + ; qL)g :
If p0 < pC ; the unique optimal menu is
 
xCH ; q
C
H

;
 
xCL ; q
C
L
	
as in equation (1). Finally,
if p0 = pC ; then there are two optimal deterministic mechanisms: f(LqL + ; qL)g and 
xCH ; q
C
H

;
 
xCL ; q
C
L
	
as in equation (1). In addition, if p0 = pC there is a continuum of op-
timal random mechanisms, since any randomization between the two optimal deterministic
mechanism is also an optimal mechanism.
Suppose that p0 < pC or that p0 = pC and  > 0: It is immediate to see that in the
dynamic game with limited commitment it is impossible to implement, in every period, the
optimal mechanism of the form
 
xCH ; q
C
H

;
 
xCL ; q
C
L
	
: This is because, according to Lemma
1, the rms continuation payo¤must be equal to i (qi ) as soon as the rm discovers that
the worker is of type i.7
It is also easy to see that for p0 > pC , the rms payo¤ in any PBE must be equal
to p0L (qL) (it cannot be smaller because of Lemma 1, and it cannot be larger because
f(LqL + ; qL)g is an optimal mechanism with commitment). Therefore, if p0 > pC all
PBE share the following feature. The high type quits the relationship in the rst period,
while the low type accepts the contract (LqL + ; q

L) in every period.
6To see why pC > p^, let V CF (p) be the commitment payo¤ of the rm when the prior is p: It is straight-
forward to show that V CF () is strictly increasing. If pC 6 p^; then we obtain the following contradiction:
V CF (p
C) = pCL (q

L) 6 p^L (qL) = H (qH) = V CF (0):
7Notice that H
 
qCH

< H (q

H) since q
C
H < q

H : Also v (q

L) LqL  qCH < L (qL) since qCH > 0:
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4 Existence and Learning
In this section, we show the existence of PBE for generic values of the parameters. We
also identify the conditions under which the rm is able to learn the workers type (with
and without ring). In particular, if the parties are impatient, then learning is possible for
any prior. In contrast, if the parties are su¢ ciently patient, then learning takes place only
when the rm is willing to re the high-cost worker.
We start with a general result that holds in every PBE: the low-cost workers relationship
with the rm lasts forever. Formally, we have the result below. We say that a certain
property holds for almost all the menus o¤ered by the rm at ht if Ft (h
t) assigns probability
one to the set of menus satisfying the property.
Lemma 2 Fix a PBE (; ) and an arbitrary history ht: For almost all the menus mt
o¤ered by the rm at ht; we haveX
(xt;qt)2mt
Lt
 
(xt; qt) jht;mt

= 1
To see why Lemma 2 is true, suppose that there are a PBE (; ) and a history ht at
which the low type rejects all the contracts in the rms menu with positive probability.
This implies that the interaction with the high type must yield a strictly positive contin-
uation payo¤ to the rm, otherwise its continuation payo¤ would be strictly smaller than
 (ht)L (q

L) ; contradicting Lemma 1. Clearly, a strictly positive continuation payo¤ is
possible only if the high type is expected to deliver a strictly positive (discounted) quality
in the future. This and the individual rationality of the high types behavior imply that
the low types decision to quit is not optimal, as he can guarantee a strictly positive payo¤
by imitating the high-cost worker at ht and in every future period.
Suppose that the rm is interested in separating the two types and learning the workers
cost. This requires the existence of two decisions, one of which is taken only by the high
type while the other is taken only by the low type. After observing the rst (second)
decision, the rm becomes convinced that the workers cost is high (low).
In the light of Lemma 2, there are two ways in which separation can take place in
equilibrium. One possibility is separation with ring: the high type quits the relationship
and one of the contracts in the rms menu is accepted only the low type. The other
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possibility is separation with employment : one contract in the rms menu is accepted only
by the high type, while another contract is accepted only by the low type.
Our next result shows that separation with employment cannot occur for large values
of the discount factor.
Lemma 3 Suppose that  > ^ := 1
1+qH
and let (; ) be an arbitrary PBE of the game. It
is impossible to nd a history (ht;mt) (on or o¤-path) satisfying the following properties:
i)  (ht) 2 (0; 1) ;
ii) there exists a contract (xH ; qH) in mt for which Ht ((xH ; qH) jht;mt) > 0 and
Lt ((xH ; qH) jht;mt) = 0;
iii) there exists a contract (xL; qL) in mt for which Lt ((xL; qL) jht;mt) > 0 and
Ht ((xL; qL) jht;mt) = 0:
By contradiction, suppose that at ht the belief is nondegenerate and the rms menu
contains a contract (xi; qi) that is accepted (with positive probability) only by the type
i = H;L: Following the acceptance of this contract, the rms belief will assign probability
one to the type i.8 Furthermore, in equilibrium, the type i will select the e¢ cient contract
(iq

i + ; q

i ) in every period after t: It is then easy to see that if the discount factor is su¢ -
ciently large, it is impossible to nd two contracts, (xH ; qH) and (xL; qL) ; to satisfy the two
incentive compatibility constraints. If  > ^; for any pair of contracts ((xH ; qH) ; (xL; qL)) ;
either the low type prefers to imitate the high type (at ht and in every future period), or
the high type has an incentive to adopt the take the money and runstrategy (i.e., the
strategy of accepting the generous contract (xL; qL) and then quitting).
We are now ready to state the main result of this section, which establishes (generic)
existence of PBE.
Proposition 1 For generic values of the parameters, there exists a PBE.
The proof of Proposition 1 (in Appendix B) shows how to construct a PBE for all values
of  outside a set of discount factors which can contain at most two elements (the values
of these two elements depend on the primitives H ; L; ; v ()).9 For the remainder of the
paper, we assume that the discount factor  does not belong to this (possibly empty) set.
8Notice that in a PBE, the beliefs must satisfy this condition at all histories, including those that are
o¤-path.
9Our formal argument does not cover the values of  at which the mapping V 1 : [0; 1] ! R dened in
equation (18) (see Appendix B) satises simultaneously V 1 (0) = H (qH) and @+V
1 (0) = 0. We show
that there can be at most two such values of :
12
The equilibrium that we construct satises a number of properties. First, the equilib-
rium is almost Markovianin the sense that the partiesbehavior in period t depends on
the rms belief and their actions in period t  1 (the history up to period t  2 a¤ects the
behavior in period t only through the belief). Second, the high type plays a pure strategy
and his equilibrium payo¤ is equal to zero. Third, the menu proposed by the rm (at any
history) contains at most two contracts. Finally, the rm adopts a deterministic behavior
at on-path histories.
We now introduce some denitions to illustrate our equilibrium. First, we say that
there is a pooling allocation if the rm o¤ers the menu f(HqH + ; qH)g in every period
and both types accept the contract (HqH + ; q

H) (with probability one). We also say that
there is a ring allocation if the rm o¤ers the menu f(LqL + ; qL)g in every period, the
high type quits in the rst period, and the low type accepts the contract (LqL + ; q

L) in
every period. Finally, we say there is a sequentially screening allocation if the rm o¤ers a
menu with two contracts in every period in which its belief is nondegenerate. Furthermore,
the high type accepts the rst contract with probability one, while the low type accepts
the second contract with strictly positive probability (if this probability is less than one,
the low type randomizes between the two contracts). Therefore, in a sequentially screening
allocation either the rm learns that the workers type is low or it becomes more condent
that the workers type is high.
To illustrate our construction it is convenient to distinguish between the case  6 ^ and
the case  > ^: We start with the rst case. We assume (without loss) that the rm o¤ers
the menu f(HqH + ; qH)g when the belief p is equal to zero. Also, the rm o¤ers the
menu f(LqL + ; qL)g when p > pC : For any belief p 2
 
0; pC

we rst give the following
three options to the rm: i) o¤ering a pooling menu, i.e. a menu with one contract that
is accepted by both types; ii) o¤ering a ring menu, i.e. a menu with one contract that
induces separation with ring (i.e., the low type accepts the contract while the high type
quits); iii) o¤ering a menu with two contracts to induce separation with employment (this
means that, with probability one, the two types choose di¤erent contracts).
Clearly, the optimal pooling menu is f(HqH + ; qH)g ; while the optimal ring menu
is f(LqL + ; qL)g : In case iii), we choose the two contracts to maximize the rms payo¤
subject to the incentive compatibility (IC) and the individual rationality (IR) constraints.
Notice that after separation with employment, the rms belief is either zero or one. In
both cases, the rms behavior is known and we can compute the two typescontinuation
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payo¤s. As in the standard mechanism design problem with commitment, the optimal
menu in case iii) is such that both the low types IC constraint and the high types IR
constraint are binding.
We construct the rms value function V (; 1) and the low types payo¤ correspondence
 (; 1) when the rm is forced to choose one of the three options above.10 We take V (; 1)
and  (; 1) as given and o¤er the rm the possibility of probabilistic separation with em-
ployment. This means that the rm o¤ers two contracts. The high type accepts the rst
contract with probability one, while the low type randomizes between the contracts. After
this round of probabilistic separation, the rm is again forced to use the three options
above and, therefore, the parties continuation payo¤s are given by V (; 1) and  (; 1) : In
the probabilistic separation phase, we select the two contracts and the low types behavior
(i.e., the probability of accepting each contract) to maximize the rms payo¤ subject, of
course, to the IC and IR constraints. As usual, the solution to the optimization problem
satises the low types IC constraint with equality and, therefore, randomizing between the
two contracts is indeed optimal for the low-cost worker.
The possibility of probabilistic separation denes a new value function V (; 2) and a
new payo¤ correspondence  (; 2) : If V (p; 2) = V (p; 1) for every p 2 [0; 1], then we stop
the process as the rm does not benet from probabilistic separation. On the other hand,
if V (p; 2) > V (p; 1) (it is also easy to construct examples for which this is the case), then
we allow for an additional round of probabilistic separation with employment.
We continue the process (allowing, at each iteration, for a new round of probabilistic
separation) until we nd a xed point (V () ; ()) :We show that for generic values of the
parameters a xed point exists and is achieved after nitely many iterations. Moreover,
our proof shows that if we x the parameters (H ; L; ; v ()) ; then there is T such that for
generic discount factors smaller than 1  qH=qL; the number of iterations is smaller than T
(see Corollary 1 below for the implications of this result).
The pair (V () ; ()) allows us to construct a simple equilibrium. For each belief p; the
parties behave according to the solution of the rms optimization problem (which yields
the payo¤ V (p) to the rm). The solution consists of the optimal menu and the workers
behavior. In particular, if the optimal menu is f(HqH + ; qH)g ; then both types accept
the contract. If the optimal menu is f(LqL + ; qL)g ; then only the low type accepts the
10For some values of the beliefs p; the solution to the rms problem is not unique and di¤erent solutions
generally yield di¤erent payo¤s to the low type (hence we use the correspondence  (; 1)).
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contract. Finally, if the optimal menu contains two contracts, then the high type accepts
the rst contract (with probability one) while the low type accepts the second contract with
probability in (0; 1] (this probability is part of the solution to the optimization problem).
The proof of Proposition 1 also species the partieso¤-path behavior and shows that
unilateral deviations are not protable.
We conclude the discussion of the case of a low discount factor pointing out a property
of our equilibria. Fix a PBE (; ) :We say that there is full learning by period t if for any
t0 > t and for any on-path public history ht0 ; the belief 
 
ht
0
is either zero or one. This
means that all the uncertainty about the workers ability is resolved by period t:
Our construction shows that when the parties are not too patient, the rm never chooses
the pooling allocation. Depending on the value of the prior, the rm prefers either the
sequentially screening allocation (if the prior is low) or the ring allocation (if the prior is
high). In both cases, there is full learning. Moreover, our proof shows that the number of
periods until the worker completely reveals his private information is uniformly bounded.11
Formally, we have the following result.
Corollary 1 Fix the parameters (H ; L; ; v ()) : There exists T 2 f1; 2; : : :g such that for
any prior p0 and for generic values of the discount factor smaller than 1   qH=qL; there
exists a PBE with full learning by period T:
Finally, we point out that as  shrinks to zero, the rms equilibrium payo¤ converges
to the payo¤ of the optimal mechanism with commitment. It is easy to check that this is
a general property that holds for all PBE.12
We now turn to the case the case  > ^: Recall that in this case separation with
employment is not feasible. Therefore, the rm is unable to implement a sequentially
screening allocation. As a result, it chooses between the pooling and the ring allocation.
The equilibrium that we construct takes a very simple form. If the prior is weakly larger
than p^; the rm o¤ers the optimal ring menu f(LqL + ; qL)g in every period and the
high-cost worker quits in the rst period. Thus, the equilibrium is with full learning by
period one. In contrast, if the prior is smaller than p^; the rm o¤ers the optimal pooling
menu f(HqH + ; qH)g in every period and never updates (along the equilibrium path) its
belief.
11This follows from the argument provided at the end of the proof of Lemma 9.
12For brevity, we omit the proof of this simple nding.
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The analysis in this section shows that when the parties are su¢ ciently patient the
ratchet e¤ect has a strong impact on equilibrium behavior. In particular, it suggests that
for su¢ ciently large values of ; the rm can learn the workers cost only by ring the high
type. As we will see in the next section, this is not a special feature of our equilibrium but
a much more general result.
5 Limit Uniqueness
In the last section, we constructed a very simple equilibrium for the case in which the parties
are su¢ ciently patient ( > ^). This equilibrium implements the pooling allocation when
the prior is smaller than p^ and the ring allocation when the prior is larger than p^: Our
construction relies on the fact that a sequentially screening allocation is not feasible when
the discount factor is above ^: However, the rm could, in principle, employ more complex
dynamic screening strategies. For instance, one could imagine an equilibrium in which two
or more contracts in the rms menu are accepted with positive but di¤erent probabilities
by the two types (in this case, the rms belief could increase without jumping to one, as
happens in a sequentially screening allocation). This raises the question of whether there
are other equilibrium outcomes in addition to the one identied in Section 4. Moreover,
can the rm do better than just o¤ering the optimal pooling menu or the optimal ring
menu?
We show that in the limit, as the parties become arbitrarily patient, there exists a unique
equilibrium outcome. This outcome coincides with the equilibrium outcome in Section 4
(for the case  > ^). First, consider the case p0 > p^: In the limit, as  goes to one, the
equilibrium allocation is ring and the high type quits the relationship without delay. In
contrast, if p0 < p^; the limiting equilibrium allocation is pooling and there is no learning.13
Proposition 2 provides a formal characterization of the limiting outcome. Recall that T
denotes the random time at which the worker quits the relationship.
Proposition 2 I) Fix p0 > p^ and consider a sequence of discount factors fng1n=1 con-
verging to one. For every n = 1; 2; : : : ; let (n; n) be a PBE of the game with discount
factor n. Then we have:
13In the case in which the prior p0 is equal to p^; the limiting equilibrium outcome is not uniquely pinned
down as there are PBE implementing the pooling allocation, the ring allocation and convex combinations
of such allocations.
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i) limn!1 E(n;n)

Tn j H

= 1;
ii) limn!1 E(n;n)
"
(1  n)
T 1X
t=0
tn jqt   qLj jL
#
= 0;
iii) limn!1 E(n;n)
"
(1  n)
T 1X
t=0
tn (xt   LqL   ) jL
#
= 0:
II) Fix p0 < p^ and consider a sequence of discount factors fng1n=1 converging to one.
For every n = 1; 2; : : : ; let (n; n) be a PBE of the game with discount factor n. Then we
have:
i) limn!1 E(n;n)

Tn

= 0;
ii) limn!1 E(n;n)
"
(1  n)
T 1X
t=0
tn jqt   qH j
#
= 0;
iii) For i = H;L; limn!1 E(n;n)
"
(1  n)
T 1X
t=0
tn (xt   HqH   ) ji
#
= 0:
The rest of the section provides the proof of Proposition 2 which consists of several
steps. We outline in detail each step and relegate some technical arguments to Appendix
C. To simplify the exposition, in this section and in Appendix C we assume that  > 0
(some steps of the proof are more involved when  = 0). In Appendix D, we show how to
modify the proof to deal with the case  = 0:
Any equilibrium (; ) must satisfy the following two properties (among others). First,
at every history ht the rms continuation payo¤must be at least equal tomax fH (qH) ;  (ht)L (qL)g :
Second, at any point of the relationship the low type must prefer to follow his strategy
rather than mimicking the high type from that point onwards. We show that when the
prior is above p^ and the discount factor  is close to one, only the allocations that are close
(according to the metric implicit in the statement of Proposition 2) to the ring allocation
can simultaneously satisfy the two properties mentioned above. In contrast, if p0 < p^ and
 is close to one, only the allocations that are close to the pooling allocation can satisfy
the two properties.
We start with the following simple observation. To prove Proposition 2 it is enough to
restrict attention to equilibria in which (i) the rms strategy in the rst period is pure
(i.e., the rm does not randomize among di¤erent menus at t = 0); and (ii) the high types
equilibrium payo¤ is equal to zero.
To see why restriction (i) is without loss, suppose that
  
F ; H ; L

; 

is a PBE and
m0 is a menu o¤ered with positive probability by the rm at t = 0 (F0 (m0jh0) > 0).
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Let ~F be the strategy which is identical to F in every period except the rst one in
which the rm o¤ers the menu m0 with certainty (~F0 (m0jh0) = 1). It is immediate to
see that
  
~F ; H ; L

; 

is also a PBE. Furthermore, the outcome of the equilibrium  
~F ; H ; L

; 

coincides with the continuation outcome of
  
F ; H ; L

; 

after the
rm proposes the contract m0: Therefore, if there exists a sequence of equilibria which
violate Proposition 2, then there also exists a sequence of equilibria which violate the
proposition and satisfy restriction (i).
We now turn to restriction (ii). Suppose that (; ) is a PBE in which the rm o¤ers the
menum0 (with probability one) in the rst period and which yields a strictly positive payo¤
WH (h
0; (; )) to the high type. Then it is possible to construct a new PBE (~; ~) which is
outcome equivalent to (; ) except for the fact that the rst-period transfers are uniformly
decreased by (1  ) 1WH (h0; (; )) : In other words, in the rst period the rm replaces
every contract (x0; q0) in the menum0 with the contract
 
x0   (1  ) 1WH (h0; (; )) ; q0

:14
Finally, notice that the rst two results in Proposition 2 (Part I and Part II) do not depend
on the the equilibrium transfers while the third result follows from the rst two (for Part
I, this is veried in the end of Section 5.1, while for Part II this is veried in the end of
Appendix C).
The next result summarizes our initial ndings.
Claim 1 In the rest of the proof of Proposition 2, it is without loss of generality to restrict
attention to equilibria (; ) in which the rms strategy in the rst period is pure and
WH (h
0; (; )) = 0:
Consider a PBE which yields a zero payo¤ to the high type. If all the contracts accepted
with positive probability by the high type take the form (Hq + ; q) ; for some q 2 [0; 1],
then we can express the partiespayo¤ in terms of the qualities delivered by the worker and
the analysis is somewhat simplied. In general, there is no guarantee that in equilibrium
the high type breaks even with every contract when his initial payo¤ is equal to zero.
However, our next result shows that it is still possible to express the partiespayo¤s in
terms of the qualities. In particular, we are interested in the payo¤s of the rm and the
14In the new equilibrium (~; ~) ; each type of the worker accepts the contract
x0   (1  ) 1WH
 
h0; (; )

; q0

with the same probability with which he accepts the contract
(x0; q0) in the original equilibrium (; ) :
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low type, both when he follows his strategy and when he mimics the high type (recall the
two properties above that any equilibrium must satisfy).
Lemma 4 Fix a PBE (; ) and let ht be a history such that  (ht) < 1 andWH (ht; (; )) =
0: Fix p 2 ( (ht) ; 1) and let ~T 2N [ f1g denote the random time that stops the play at
the rst history

h
~T;m~T

at which the menu m~T contains a contract (x~T; q~T) accepted with
positive probability and for which 

h
~T;m~T; (x~T; q~T)

> p (we set ~T =1 if the event does
not occur in nite time). Then we have:
VF
 
ht

= E(;)
24(1  ) ~T 1X
=t
 tH (q ) + If~T<1g
~T t

VF

h
~T;m~T

+WH

h
~T;m~T

jht
35
WL
 
ht

= E(;)
24(1  ) ~T 1X
=t
 tq + If~T<1g
~T t

WL

h
~T;m~T

 WH

h
~T;m~T

jht; L
35
WLH
 
ht

> E(;)
24(1  ) ~T 1X
=t
 tq   If~T<1g
~T tWH

h
~T;m~T

jht; H
35
where WLH (ht) denotes the low types continuation payo¤ at ht if he mimics the high type
(at ht and at any history that follows).
The argument behind this result is simple and consists in a change in the timing of
transfers. To see how this works, consider a history ht at which WH (ht) = 0: Let mt be
a menu o¤ered (with positive probability) by the rm at ht and let (xt; qt) be a contract
accepted by the high type. Let ht+1 denote the history (ht;mt; (xt; qt)) : If WH (ht+1) = 0;
then we clearly have xt = Hqt+: If insteadWH (ht;mt; (xt; qt)) > 0, then we increase the
transfer xt by the amount (1 )WH (h
t+1) : Clearly, the new transfer is equal to Hqt + :
At the same time, for every menu mt+1 o¤ered at ht+1; we decrease all the transfers of the
contracts in mt+1 by the amount 1(1 )WH (h
t+1;mt+1) : These changes leave the parties
continuation payo¤s unchanged. We repeat this procedure in period t+ 1; : : : ; ~T  1:
5.1 High Belief Case: p > p^
We proceed with the analysis of the game when the prior is above p^: Recall that that when
the prior belongs to

pC ; 1

the unique equilibrium outcome is the ring allocation. Our
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goal is to show that this result extends in the limit, as  goes to one, if p0 > p^. The
statement of Proposition 2 denes the notion of closeness to the ring allocation. A related
and useful notion of closeness is brought by our next denition, where we dene ring
regions. When the rms belief falls in a ring region, both the expected discounted length
of the rms relationship with the high type as well as the low types continuation payo¤
vanish as the parties become arbitrarily patient.
Denition 2 The interval [p; 1] is a ring region if there exist K > 0 and  < 1 such that
the following holds. Fix  >  and an arbitrary PBE (; ) : Consider a history ht at which
 (ht) > p: Then we have:
i) E(;)
h
(1  )
XT 1
=t
 tjht; H
i
; the expected discounted time until the high type quits
the relationship, is bounded by K (1  ) ;
ii) VF (ht; (; ) ; H); the rms continuation payo¤ at the history ht conditional on type
H; is bounded by K (1  ) ;
iii) WL (ht; (; )) ; the low types continuation payo¤ at the history ht; is bounded by
K (1  ) :
Our next result bounds the expected length of the relationship and the partiespayo¤
when the rms menu contains a contract that leads to a ring region.
Lemma 5 Suppose that [p; 1] is a ring region. There exist K > 0 and ~ < 1 such that for
every  > ~ the following holds. Let (; ) be a PBE and consider an arbitrary history ht
with  (ht) < p: Suppose that at ht the rm o¤ers a menu mt containing a contract
 
xLt ; q
L
t

accepted with positive probability and for which

 
ht;mt;
 
xLt ; q
L
t

> p
Then we have:
i) E(;)
h
(1  )
XT 1
=t
 tjht;mt; H
i
; the expected discounted time until the high type
quits the relationship, is bounded by K (1  ) ;
ii) VF (ht;mt; (; ) ; H); the rms continuation payo¤ at the history (ht;mt) conditional
on type H; is bounded by K (1  ) ;
iii) WL (ht;mt; (; )) ; the low types continuation payo¤ at the history (ht;mt) ; is
bounded by K (1  ) :
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This result is closely connected to Lemma 3 which establishes that separation with
employment cannot occur for large values of the discount factor. In fact, following the
acceptance of a contract
 
xLt ; q
L
t

that leads to the ring region, the low types continuation
payo¤ is close to zero. Suppose the rms relationship with the high type is long lasting.
In this case, only a large transfer xLt can prevent the low type from mimicking the high
type. But then it becomes protable for the high type to accept the contract
 
xLt ; q
L
t

and
then quit.
We are now ready to state the key result for the region of high beliefs.
Lemma 6 For every " 2 (0; 1  p^) the interval [p^+ "; 1] is a ring region.
Proof of Lemma 6.
For every p > p^ let f (p) 2 [0; p  p^] be dened by
f (p)
p
0H (0) +

1  f (p)
p

H (q

H) = (p  f (p))L (qL) (2)
It is easy to check that the function f : [p^; 1] ! [0; 1  p^] is strictly increasing and
satises f (p^) = 0:15
The proof is by induction. We set p (1) = pC and p (n) = p (n  1)  f(p(n 1))
2
for
n = 2; 3; : : : : Clearly, the interval [p (1) ; 1] is a ring region. We now prove the inductive
step.
Claim 2 Suppose that the interval [p; 1] ; p 2 (p^; 1) ; is a ring region. Then
h
p  f(p)
2
; 1
i
is also a ring region.
Fix  and a PBE (; ) and assume, without loss of generality (see Claim 1), that
WH (h
0) = 0. To simplify the exposition, we bound the expected length of the relationship
(when the worker is of typeH) and the partiescontinuation payo¤s at the empty history h0:
However, our bounds apply to any history ht with  (ht) 2
h
p  f(p)
2
; p

:16 It is convenient
to start with the rst property of a ring region and show that the expected discounted
time until the high type quits is bounded by K (1  ) (for  large). We then use this result
to establish the other two properties of a ring region.
15Recall that the function H () is concave and, therefore, 0H (0) > 0H (0) qH > H (qH) :
16This is because the continuation play starting at some history ht is an equilibrium of the original game
(when the prior is equal to the rms belief at ht).
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We let ~T 2N [ f1g denote the random time that stops the play at the rst history
h
~T;m~T

at which the menu m~T contains a contract (x~T; q~T) accepted with positive prob-
ability and for which 

h
~T;m~T; (x~T; q~T)

> p:
Recall that [p; 1] is a ring region and notice that properties i) and ii) in Lemma 5
immediately imply that the high types continuation payo¤ at time ~T is close to zero when
 is large (in fact, WH

h
~T;m~T

is bounded above by WL

h
~T;m~T

). Thus, it follows from
Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 that there exist K > 0 and  < 1 such that for  >  we can bound
the partiespayo¤s as follows:
VF (h
0) 6 VF (h0) := E(;)
24(1  ) ~T 1X
t=0
tH (qt) + If~T<1g
~T

h
~T

L (q

L)
35+K (1  )
WL (h
0) 6 WL (h0) := E(;)
24(1  ) ~T 1X
t=0
tqtjL
35+K (1  )
WLH (h
0) > WLH (h0) := E(;)
24(1  ) ~T 1X
t=0
tqtjH
35 K (1  )
(3)
Furthermore, K and  are such that for every  >  the length of the high types
relationship is bounded as follows (this also follows from Lemma 5):
E(;)
"
(1  )
T 1X
t=0
tjh0; H
#
6 E(;)
24(1  ) ~T 1X
t=0
tjh0; H
35+K (1  ) (4)
Recall that for any equilibrium (; ), VF (h0) is bounded below by p0L (qL) and
WL (h
0) must be larger than WLH (h0) : This and the inequalities in (3) imply VF (h0) >
p0L (q

L) and WL (h
0) > WLH (h0) : We now show that the last two inequalities can be si-
multaneously satised only if the expected discounted length of the high types relationship
shrinks to zero as  goes to one. Formally, we will prove the following result.
Fact 1 Fix K > 0 and p > p^. There exists K 0 > 0 such that, for every p0 2
h
p  f(p)
2
; p
i
;
for every ; and for every PBE (; ) (with WH (h0; (; )) = 0) the following holds. Given
K and (; ) compute VF (h0) ; WL (h0) ; and WLH (h
0) as in (3). If VF (h0) > p0L (qL)
and WL (h0) > WLH (h0) ; then E(;)
h
(1  )
XT 1
t=0
tjh0; H
i
6 K 0 (1  ) :
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To prove this fact, we apply mechanism-design and information-design techniques to
our setting. We take a PBE (; ) and construct a direct mediated mechanism that de-
livers the payo¤ VF (h0) to the rm, the payo¤ WL (h0) to the low type if he announces
his type truthfully, and the payo¤WLH (h
0) to the low type if he lies about his type. The
direct mechanism is as follows. The worker reveals his private information to a designer
who, in turn, chooses an outcome and reports it to the rm. The outcome consists of a
history h~T of the game and a message in fm0;mpg : In particular, if the worker announces
the low type, then the designer chooses the outcome

h
~T;mp

with probability Pr

h
~TjL

;
the probability of the history h~T when the workers type is low and the parties play the
equilibrium (; ) : On the other hand, if the worker announces the high type, then the
designer chooses the outcome

h
~T;mp

with probability Pr

h
~TjH

(h~T)(1 p)
(1 (h~T))p and the out-
come

h
~T;m0

with probability Pr

h
~TjH

1  (h
~T)(1 p)
(1 (h~T))p

: The randomization between
mp and m0 is chosen in such a way that upon observing any outcome

h
~T;mp

the rms
belief is equal to p. In fact, notice that
Pr(Ljh~T;mp)
Pr(Hjh~T;mp) =
p0 Pr(h~TjL)
(1 p0) Pr(h~TjH)
(h~T)(1 p)
(1 (h~T))p
=
=
0@ p0 Pr

h
~TjL

(1  p0) Pr
 
h~TjH
1A
| {z } 
(h~T)
1 (h~T)
!


1 (h~T)
(h~T)



p
1 p

= p
1 p
Clearly, upon observing any outcome

h
~T;m0

the rms belief is equal to zero.
We now turn to the payo¤s of the rm and the low type. The rms payo¤ depends
only on the outcome and not on the message sent by worker to the designer. Consider an
arbitrary history h~T =
 
m0; (x0; q0) ; : : : ;m~T;
 
x~T 1; q~T 1

: If the outcome is

h
~T;mp

; the
rms payo¤ is equal to:
(1  )
~T 1X
t=0
tH (qt) + If~T<1g
~TpL (q

L) +K (1  )
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If the outcome is

h
~T;m0

; the rms payo¤ is equal to:
(1  )
~T 1X
t=0
tH (qt) +K (1  )
It is immediate to check that if every type reveals his type truthfully, then the rms
expected payo¤ is equal to VF (h0) :
Consider now the low type. His payo¤depends both on the outcome and on the message
that he sends to the designer. First, if the outcome is either

h
~T;mp

or

h
~T;m0

; then
the low type obtains a payo¤ equal to
(1  )
~T 1X
t=0
tqt
In addition, the low type obtains an extra payo¤ which is equal to K (1  ) if he is
honest, and equal to  K (1  ) if he lies to the designer. It follows that the low types
expected payo¤ is equal to WL (h0) if he reveals his type truthfully, and equal to WLH (h
0)
if he lies to the mediator.
Recall that the low types incentive compatibility constraint WL (h0) > WLH (h0) is
satised since it is slacker than the equilibrium constraint WL (h0) > WLH (h0). There-
fore, we say that the mechanism is incentive compatible (we assume that the high type is
sincere).17
It is natural to ask why we introduced the messages m0 and mp in the mechanism given
that they do not a¤ect the workers payo¤s and the rm is a passive player in this construc-
tion. In particular, there exists a payo¤ equivalent and incentive compatible mechanism
in which the designer chooses only the history h~T (with probabilities that depend on the
workers report) and the rms payo¤ is equal to
(1  )
~T 1X
t=0
tH (qt) + If~T<1g
~T

h
~T

L (q

L) +K (1  )
The reason is that the additional messages allow us to classify all the histories h~T into
two large classes, depending on whether they are associated to the message m0 or to the
17We (weakly) enlarge the set of incentive compatible mechanisms by assuming sincere behavior of the
high type.
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message mp: Recall that when the rm observes the message mz; z = 0; p; its belief is equal
to z: Thus, by the martingale property of the beliefs (see Aumann and Maschler (1995)
and Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)), we conclude that the probability of observing the
message m0 is equal to

1  p0
p

while the probability of observing the message mp is equal
p0
p
:
This allows us to rewrite the rms payo¤ VF (h0) as follows:
VF (h
0) =

1  p0
p

E(;)
24(1  ) ~T 1X
t=0
tH (qt) jm0
35+
p0
p
E(;)
24(1  ) ~T 1X
t=0
tH (qt) + If~T<1g
~TpL (q

L) jmp
35+K (1  )
We now consider the low types incentive compatibility constraint. Fix an arbitrary out-
come

h
~T;mp

and let Pr

h
~T;mp

denote the ex-ante probability of the outcome. Recall
that the rms belief upon observing the outcome

h
~T;mp

is equal to p: This immediately
implies:
Pr

h
~T;mp

=
p0
p
Pr

h
~T;mpjL

=
1  p0
1  p Pr

h
~T;mpjH

We conclude that the outcome

h
~T;mp

is reached with probability p
p0
Pr

h
~T;mp

when
the worker announces that his type is low, and with probability 1 p
1 p0 Pr

h
~T;mp

when the
worker announces that his type is high.
Similarly, an outcome

h
~T;m0

is reached with probability 1
1 p0 Pr

h
~T;m0

if the
worker announces the high type and with probability zero if the worker announces the
low type (Pr

h
~T;m0

denotes the ex-ante probability of the outcome).
Combining these observations, we can rewrite the low types payo¤s as follows:
WL
 
h0

= E(;)
24(1  ) ~T 1X
t=0
tqtjmp
35+K (1  )
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WLH (h
0) =

1
1 p0

1  p0
p

E(;)
24(1  ) ~T 1X
t=0
tqtjm0
35+

1 p
1 p0

p0
p

E(;)
24(1  ) ~T 1X
t=0
tqtjmp
35 K (1  )
We now construct an upper bound VF (h0) to VF (h0) and show that the expected
discounted length of the high types relationship is bounded by K 0 (1  ) if VF (h0) >
p0L (q

L) and WL (h
0) > WLH (h0) : Clearly, this will imply Fact 1.
For z = 0; p; we let
z = E(;)
24(1  ) ~T 1X
t=0
tjmz
35
denote the expected discounted length of the relationship conditional on the message mz;
and let ~qz be dened by
E(;)
24(1  ) ~T 1X
t=0
tqtjmz
35 = z~qz
Using this, the concavity of the function H () and Jensens inequality we obtain the
desired bound on VF (h0):
VF (h
0) 6 VF (h0) :=

1  p0
p

0H (~q0) +
p0
p
[pH (~qp) + (1 p) pL (qL)] +K (1  )
At the same time, we can express WL (h0) and WLH (h
0) as:
WL (h
0) = p~qp +K (1  )
WLH (h
0) =

1
1 p0

1  p0
p

0~q0 +

1 p
1 p0

p0
p

p~qp  K (1  )
Finally, using the denition of 0 and p and inequality (4), we obtain the following
bound to the length of the high types relationship:
E(;)
"
(1  )
T 1X
t=0
tjh0; H
#
6

1
1  p0

1  p0
p

0 +

1  p
1  p0

p0
p

p +K (1  )
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The following claim concludes the proof of Fact 1.
Claim 3 Fix K > 0 and p > p^. There exists K 0 > 0 such that, for every p0 2
h
p  f(p)
2
; p
i
;
for every ; and for all (z; ~qz) 2 [0; 1]2, z = 0; p; the inequalities
1  p0
p

0H (~q0) +
p0
p
[pH (~qp) + (1 p) pL (qL)] +K (1  ) > p0L (qL) (5)
p~qp+K (1  ) >

1
1  p0

1  p0
p

0~q0+

1  p
1  p0

p0
p

p~qp K (1  )
(6)
are simultaneously satised only if
1
1  p0

1  p0
p

0 +

1  p
1  p0

p0
p

p +K (1  ) 6 K 0 (1  ) (7)
Notice that inequalities (5) and (6) capture the constraints VF (h0) > p0L (qL) and
WL (h
0) > WLH (h0) ; while the left hand side of inequality (7) represents the upper bound
to the expected discounted length of the high types relationship.
The proof of Claim 3 is tedious and relegated to Appendix C. The logic behind this claim
is better understood when one considers the problem of maximizing VF (h0) (with respect to
z and ~qz, z = 0; p) subject to the incentive compatibility constraint WL (h0) > WLH (h0) :
Clearly, VF (h0) is maximized by setting 0 equal to one, ~q0 equal to qH ; and p equal to
zero (recall that p > p^ and, therefore, pL (qL) > H (q

H) > H (~qp) for any ~qp). However,
this would violate the low types incentive compatibility constraint. Hence the following
trade-o¤emerges. To increase the rms payo¤by increasing 0 and satisfying the incentive
compatibility constraint (6) it is necessary to increase p as well, which decreases the rms
payo¤. Notice that when the prior p0 is close to p,

1  p0
p

0 and ~q0 have a small impact
both on the rms payo¤ and the constraint. In contrast, p has a small impact on the
constraint, and a large (negative) impact on the rms payo¤. We conclude that for 
and p0 su¢ ciently large, the optimal values of

1  p0
p

0 and p must be close to zero.
Therefore, if we could maximize the rmss payo¤ subject to WL (h0) > WLH (h0) the
solution would be close to a ring allocation, yielding a payo¤ close to p0L (qL) : For the
same reason, any allocation that satises WL (h0) > WLH (h0) and that is not close to a
ring allocation leads to a payo¤ for the rm smaller than p0L (qL), hence violating (5).
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We have shown that the rst property of a ring region holds: there exists K > 0
such that E(;)
"
(1  )
T 1X
t=0
tjh0; H
#
 (1  ) K: We now turn to the remaining two
properties. To verify the second property (the rms payo¤ conditional on type H shrinks
to zero weakly faster than 1  ), notice that
VF (h
0;H) 6 v (1)E(;)
"
(1  )
T 1X
t=0
tjh0; H
#
6 v (1) K (1  )
Finally, we use the result above to bound the low types continuation payo¤ WL (h0)
(third property). We have
p0L (q

L) 6 VF (h0) 6 (1  p0)VF (h0;H) + p0
 
L (q

L) WL
 
h0

which implies
WL
 
h0

6 1  p0
p0
VF (h
0;H) <
1  p^
p^
VF (h
0;H) 6 1  p^
p^
v (1) K (1  )
This concludes the proof of Claim 2 and consequently of Lemma 6. 
The argument above implies property i) of Part I of Proposition 2: limn!1E(n;n)

Tn j H

=
1: Suppose that the rest of Part I of Proposition 2 does not hold. This means that either
lim sup
n!1
E(n;n)
"
(1  n)
T 1X
t=0
tn jqt   qLj jL
#
> 0
or (notice that the rms payo¤ conditional on type L cannot be negative, otherwise the
total payo¤ would be smaller than H (qH))
lim sup
n!1
E(n;n)
"
(1  n)
T 1X
t=0
tn (xt   LqL   ) jL
#
> 0
Then it is possible to nd a subsequence of equilibria for which the rms payo¤ condi-
tional on type L converges to a value smaller than L(qL): In light of property i), this would
imply that the rms limit payo¤ would be strictly smaller than p0L(qL); a contradiction.
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5.2 Low Belief Case: p < p^
We now turn to the case of a belief p smaller than p^: We start with a simple result which
shows that the equilibrium belief cannot grow too quickly around p^ when the parties are
su¢ ciently patient.
Lemma 7 For every " > 0 there exists  < 1 satisfying the following. For every PBE
(; ) of a game in which  > ; it is impossible to nd a history ht with  (ht) < p^   "
and at which the rm o¤ers a menu mt containing a contract (xt; qt) accepted with positive
probability and such that  (ht;mt; (xt; qt)) > p^+ ":
Recall that for every " > 0; the interval [p^+ "; 1] is a ring region. Therefore, it
follows from Lemma 5 that if  is close to one and the belief jumps from  (ht) < p^  " to
 (ht;mt; (xt; qt)) > p^+"; the rms continuation payo¤at ht must be close to  (ht)L (qL) :
But then the rms payo¤would be smaller than H (qH) (since  (h
t) < p^ " and p^L (qL) =
H (q

H)), contradicting Lemma 1.
We now outline the proof of Part II of Proposition 2 (see Appendix C for the for-
mal proof). Consider the rst result which asserts that limn!1 E(n;n)

Tn

= 0. By
contradiction, let us assume that there exists a sequence fn; (n; n)g1n=1 such that n
converges to one, (n; n) is a PBE of the game with discount factor equal to n; and
limn!1 E(n;n)

Tn

=  > 0: To ease the notation, in what follows we suppress the index
n and write  and (; ) to denote an arbitrary element of the sequence. Without loss of
generality (see Claim 1), we assume that the equilibrium (; ) yields to the high type a
payo¤ equal to zero.
Fix a small " and let ~T 2N [ f1g denote the random time that stops the play at the
rst history

h
~T;m~T

at which the menu m~T contains a contract (x~T; q~T) accepted with
positive probability and for which 

h
~T;m~T; (x~T; q~T)

> p^ + ": It follows from Lemma 4,
Lemma 5, and from the fact that [p^+ "; 1] is a ring region that for  close to one we can
bound the rms equilibrium payo¤ as follows:
VF (h
0) 6 E(;)
24(1  ) ~T 1X
t=0
tH (qt) + If~T<1g
~T

h
~T

L (q

L)
35+ " 6
E(;)
24(1  ) ~T 1X
t=0
tH (qt) + If~T<1g
~T (p^+ ")L (q

L)
35+ "
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where the second inequality holds because the belief at the history h~T is bounded above
(by denition) by p^+ ":
Notice that we can take " to be arbitrarily small. Therefore, since H (qH) = p^L (q

L) ;
and qH is the unique maximizer of H () ; the inequality above implies that
E(;)
24(1  ) ~T 1X
t=0
t jqH   qtj
35  0 (8)
for  su¢ ciently large. If this were not the case, then the rms payo¤ would be strictly
smaller than H (qH) (again, for  su¢ ciently large).
We now examine the relation between E(;)

T

and E(;)
h

~T
i
when  is close to one.
First, at the history

h
~T;m~T

the expected discounted length of the relationship with the
high type is close to zero (see Lemma 5 and recall that the interval [p^+ "; 1] is a ring
region). Second, the rms belief at h~T must be close to p^ (a value of 

h
~T

far away
from p^ would contradict Lemma 7). Finally, recall that for  large, E(;)

T

is close (by
assumption) to : Putting these observations together and using Bayes rule, we conclude
that E(;)
h

~T
i
is close to 
1 p^ for  close to one.
The last part of the proof analyzes the low types incentives to follow the equilibrium
strategy and derives a contradiction. Let Pr

h
~T

denote th (ex-ante) probability of reach-
ing the history h~T and assume that the rms belief 

h
~T

is close to p^: Bayesrule tells us
that h~T is reached with probability close to p^
p0
Pr

h
~T

if the low type follows his strategy
L, and with probability close to 1 p^
1 p0 Pr

h
~T

if he mimics the high type and plays the
strategy H :
Using the denition of ~T (and the fact that [p^+ "; 1] is a ring region) we can ap-
proximate the low types payo¤s as follows. For  close to one, L yields a payo¤ close
to
E(;)
24(1  ) ~T 1X
t=0
tqtjL
35  qHE(;)
24(1  ) ~T 1X
t=0
tjL
35 
qH

1  E(;)
h

~TjL
i
 qH

1  p^
p0

1 p^
 (9)
where the rst relation follows from (8), while the third relation is a consequence of Bayes
rule.
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Similarly, the strategy H yields a payo¤ close to
E(;)
24(1  ) ~T 1X
t=0
tqtjH
35  qHE(;)
24(1  ) ~T 1X
t=0
tjH
35 
qH

1  E(;)
h

~TjH
i
 qH

1  1 p^
1 p0

1 p^
 (10)
Hence, since p0 < p^ and  > 0; (9) is greater than (10), implying the existence of a
protable deviation for values of  close to one.
Finally, the last two results in Proposition 2 Part II are direct consequences of the result
above. Intuitively, if the high type never quits the relationship, the best option for the rm
is to implement the pooling allocation.
6 Rehiring
In the model analyzed so far, the workers decision to reject all the contracts in the menu
is an irreversible action that ends the relationship. In other words, the rm cannot rehire
the worker after a period of unemployment. As we showed above, this impairs the rms
ability to screen the worker. Once the worker reveals his type, his continuation payo¤must
be equal to zero. The rm can a¤ord to pay the reservation wage because the worker has
no other alternative than ending the relationship.
This logic does not apply when rehiring is possible. In this case, the worker can credibly
threaten the rm to reject o¤ers that pay slightly above the reservation wage because he
expects to obtain a large payo¤ in the rest of the relationship. As we will see below, with
rehiring it is possible to sustain equilibrium outcomes in which the workers payo¤ remains
strictly positive even when his type is known to the other party. This, in turn, make it
easier for the rm to screen the worker.
There are di¤erent ways to break the automatic link (present in the benchmark model)
between the decision to reject all the contracts and the decision to end the relationship.
One possibility is to assume that the relationship lasts forever and quitting is now allowed.
Another possibility is to add to the benchmark model the option for the worker to reject
all the contracts and remain in the relationship. In the rest of the section, we analyze these
extensions of the model.
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We start with the innitely repeated game in which, in each period, the rm proposes a
menu of contracts. The worker either accepts a contract in the menu or rejects all of them.
Both parties obtain a payo¤ equal to zero in each period in which the worker rejects all the
contracts in menu.
Consider the standard mechanism design problem with commitment. We say that
the payo¤s (VF;H ; VF;L;WH ;WL) are incentive-compatible and ex-post strictly individually
rational if there exists an incentive compatible direct mechanism f(xH ; qH) ; (xL; qL)g ;
(xi; qi) 2 R++  [0; 1] for i = H;L; satisfying:
i) For i = H;L; the rms payo¤ VF;i when the worker is of type i is strictly positive:
VF;i := v (qi)  xi > 0;
ii) For i = H;L; type is payo¤ is strictly positive: Wi := xi   iqi    > 0:
The main result of this section is a folk theorem. We show that any prole of incentive-
compatible and ex-post strictly individual rational payo¤s can be achieved in the innitely
repeated game when the parties are su¢ ciently patient.
Proposition 3 For every tuple (VF;H ; VF;L;WH ;WL) 2 R4++ of incentive-compatible and
ex-post strictly individually rational payo¤s there exists y 2 (0; 1) such that for every
 > y there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (of innitely repeated game) that leads to
such payo¤s.
The proof of Proposition 3 is in Appendix E. Fix a tuple (VF;H ; VF;L;WH ;WL) of
incentive-compatible and ex-post strictly individually rational payo¤s and let f(xH ; qH) ; (xL; qL)g
denote the corresponding direct mechanism. We construct an equilibrium which consists
of two phases. The screening phase takes place in the rst period when the rm o¤ers the
menu f(xH ; qH) ; (xL; qL)g : Each type i = H;L selects the menu (xi; qi) and the rm learns
the workers type. The post-screening phase with type i = H;L starts in the second period
and implements the contract (xi; qi) in every period.
In equilibrium, the rm never updates its belief in the post-screening phase. It is there-
fore necessary to show that in the game with complete information with type i; there exists
an equilibrium that implements (xi; qi) in every period (when the parties are su¢ ciently
patient). The following lemma establishes this important result.
Lemma 8 Consider the innitely repeated game with complete information in which the
rm interacts with type i = H;L: Let (xi; qi) be a contract yielding the payo¤ VF;i =
32
v (qi) xi > 0 to the rm and the payo¤ Wi = xi  iqi  > 0 to the worker. There exists
y 2 (0; 1) such that for every  > y there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium that leads
to the payo¤s (VF;i;Wi) :
Proof of Lemma 8.
Fix " 2 (0;min fVF;i;Wig). Let (xi; qi ) ; xi = + iqi + "2 ; denote the e¢ cient contract
that yields the payo¤ "
2
to the worker. Also, let (xi; qi ) ; xi = v(q

i )  "2 ; denote the e¢ cient
contract that yields the payo¤ "
2
to the rm.
Consider the following strategy prole, generated by a simple three states automaton.
State (i; 0): This is the initial state. The automaton prescribes that the rm o¤ers the
menu f(xi; qi)g and the worker accepts the contract (xi; qi). The state remains (i; 0) unless
there is a deviation by the rm, in which case the state changes to (i; 1) irrespective of
the workers decision. When the rm deviates and o¤ers a menu di¤erent from f(xi; qi)g ;
the worker accepts the contract which maximizes his current payo¤, provided that this is
positive (here and in what follows, we require the worker to select the contract with the
smallest index if there are multiple contracts yielding the highest current payo¤). Finally,
the worker rejects all the contracts if they all yield a negative payo¤.
State (i; 1): The automaton prescribes that the rm o¤ers the menu f(xi; qi )g and the
worker accepts (xi; qi ). If the rm o¤ers f(xi; qi )g ; the state remains (i; 1) irrespective
of the workers decision. Suppose instead that the rm deviates and o¤ers the menu
m 6= f(xi; qi )g : The worker rejects every contract (x; q) with x < v (1) +  and selects,
among the remaining ones, the contract that yields the highest current payo¤, provided
that this is positive. If the worker accepts a contract (x; q) with x < v (1) + ; the state
changes to (i; 2) : In all other cases, the state remains (i; 1) :
State (i; 2): The automaton prescribes that the rm o¤ers the menu f(xi; qi )g and the
worker accepts (xi; q

i ). The state remains (i; 2) unless there is a deviation by the rm. In
this case, the state changes to (i; 1) irrespective of the workers decision. When the rm
deviates and o¤ers a menu di¤erent from f(xi; qi )g ; the worker accepts the contract which
maximizes his current payo¤, provided that this is positive.
This concludes the description of the automaton. We now verify that this strategy prole
is a subgame perfect equilibrium for values of  su¢ ciently large. The rms equilibrium
payo¤s are VF;i in state (i; 0) ; "2 in state (i; 1), and v (q

i )  xi in state (i; 2) : The workers
equilibrium payo¤s are Wi in state (i; 0) ; xi  iqi   in state (i; 1) ; and "2 in state (i; 2) :
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Thus, the rm obtains the largest payo¤ in state (i; 2) and the lowest payo¤ in state (i; 1) ;
while the worker obtains the largest payo¤ in state (i; 1) and the lowest payo¤ in state
(i; 2) : In fact, notice that VF;i+Wi = i (qi) and i (qi ) > i (qi) for every qi: This and the
fact that " 2 (0;min fVF;i;Wig) imply:
v (qi )  xi > VF;i > v (qi )  xi = "2
xi   iqi    > Wi > xi   iqi    = "2
It is then straightforward to check that for  su¢ ciently large one-shot deviations from
the automaton described above are not protable. 
Recall that the mechanism f(xH ; qH) ; (xL; qL)g is incentive compatible. Thus, if the
post-screening phase with type i = H;L implements the contract (xi; qi) in every period,
then in the screening phase both types of the worker have an incentive to reveal their types.
The rest of the proof of Proposition 3 provides a complete description of the equilibrium
strategies and beliefs and veries that sequential rationality is satised at all histories.
Consider now a di¤erent extension of the benchmark model in which the worker has the
option to reject all the contracts and remain in the relationship. It is easy to extend the
result of Proposition 3 to this setup. To see this, notice that the strategy of rejecting all the
contracts and quitting is weakly dominated by the strategy of rejecting all the contracts
and remaining in the relationship. Once we remove the strategy of quitting, we are back
to the innitely repeated game analyzed above.
To sum up, our analysis shows that when the relationship can continue after the worker
rejects all the contracts (either because the game is innitely repeated or because the worker
has the option to reject all the contracts and stay in the relationship), many screening
opportunities are available to the rm, including separation with employment. This is in
contrast with the benchmark model in which the relationship ends automatically after the
worker rejects all the contracts. In this case, only the pooling and the ring allocations can
be implemented when the parties are su¢ ciently patient.
7 Concluding Remarks
We studied a dynamic-contracting model with adverse selection and limited commitment.
In our benchmark model, the relationship ends when the worker rejects all contracts from
the rms menu. We characterized the limit equilibrium outcome as the parties become
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arbitrarily patient. If the prior probability that the worker has a low cost is low, the rm
o¤ers a pooling contract in every period. In contrast, if this prior probability that the
worker has a low cost is high, the rm res the worker with a high cost at the beginning of
the relationship.
In this paper, the workers action is veriable. In some situations the agents e¤ort
leads to stochastic outcomes and monitoring is thus imperfect. This would add a moral
hazard component to the screening problem. We leave this interesting extension for future
research.
Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 2.
First, assume that  (ht) > pC (recall that pC 2 (0; 1) denotes the critical value of
the prior above which the menu f(LqL + ; qL)g is optimal when there is commitment).
As explained in Section 3, in any PBE (; ) ; after a history ht with  (ht) > pC ; the
rms menu in period t; t+ 1; : : : ; contains the contract (LqL + ; q

L) and this contract is
accepted by the low type (the high type quits the relationship in period t).
Next, assume that  (ht) = 0: Again, the rms continuation payo¤ is bounded above
by H (qH) ; and the rm can guarantee this payo¤ by o¤ering the menu f(HqH + ; qH)g
in every period. Therefore, in equilibrium, the rms menu in period t; t + 1; : : : ; must
contain the contract (HqH + ; q

H). Clearly, the low type strictly prefers to accept this
contract rather than quit the relationship.
Finally, consider the case  (ht) 2  0; pC and let mt denote a menu o¤ered by the
rm at ht. By contradiction, assume that the low type quits the relationship with positive
probability. This immediately implies that the high type must accept one of the contracts
in mt with positive probability. In fact, if the high type quits with probability one, then
the rms payo¤ is strictly smaller than  (ht)L (qL), contradicting Lemma 1.
Let mHt  mt denotes the set of contracts in mt accepted by the high type with positive
probability. We claim that there is a contract
 
xHt ; q
H
t
 2 mHt such that
E(;)
"
(1  )
T 1X
=t
 tq jht;
 
xHt ; q
H
t

; H
#
> 0; (11)
where the left hand side of the inequality denotes the expected discounted total quality
delivered by the high type after he accepts the contract
 
xHt ; q
H
t

(T 61 denotes the
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random time at which the worker quits). In fact, if inequality (11) is violated for all the
contracts in mHt , then we have
VF (h
t; (; )) <  (ht)L (q

L)+
(1   (ht))
X
(xt;qt)2mHt
Ht ((xt; qt) jht;mt)E(;)
"
(1  )
T 1X
=t
 t (v (0)  ) jht; (xt; qt) ; H
#
6
 (ht)L (q

L) ;
where the rst inequality follows from the fact that the low type quits with positive prob-
ability and from the fact that the high types strategy must be individually rational (see
inequality (12) below). The second inequality uses v (0)   6 0:
Finally, notice that if
 
xHt ; q
H
t
 2 mHt ; then
E(;)
"
(1  )
T 1X
=t
 t (x   Hq   ) jht;
 
xHt ; q
H
t

; H
#
> 0; (12)
where the left hand side denotes the high types continuation payo¤ after he accepts the
contract
 
xHt ; q
H
t

: Inequalities (11) and (12) imply that at the history (ht;mt) the low type
can guarantee a strictly positive payo¤ by accepting the contract
 
xHt ; q
H
t

and mimicking
the high types behavior in every period t + 1; t + 2; : : : : This shows that the low types
decision to rejects all the contracts in mt is not optimal. 
Proof of Lemma 3.
By contradiction, suppose there exist a PBE (; ) and a history (ht;mt) satisfying
the three properties in Lemma 3. First, consider the history (ht;mt; (xH ; qH)) : The rms
belief will be equal to zero and, in equilibrium, the menu o¤ered by the rm in period
t+ 1; t+ 2; : : : ; will contain the contract (HqH + ; q

H) : Furthermore, the high type will
select this contract in every period. We conclude that following (ht;mt; (xH ; qH)) ; the high
types continuation payo¤ (evaluated at the beginning of period t + 1) will be equal to
zero. Furthermore, if the low type deviates and accepts the contract (xH ; qH) ; then his
continuation payo¤ will be at least qH (in fact, the low type can mimic the high type
and accept the contract (HqH + ; q

H) in period t+ 1; t+ 2; : : :):
Consider now the history (ht;mt; (xL; qL)) : The rms belief will be equal to one and, in
equilibrium, the low type will accept the contract (LqL + ; q

L) in period t+ 1; t+ 2; : : : :
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We conclude that after the history (ht;mt; (xL; qL)) the equilibrium continuation payo¤ of
both types (again, evaluated at the beginning of period t+ 1) is equal to zero.
Clearly, in equilibrium, the workers decision must be sequentially rational. Therefore,
the contracts (xH ; qH) and (xL; qL) must satisfy the following IC constraints:
xH   HqH    > xL   HqL    (13)
and
(1  ) (xL   LqL   ) > (1  ) (xH   LqH   ) + qH : (14)
Combining the two constraints we obtain
H (qL   qH) > xL   xH > L (qL   qH) + 
1  q

H ;
which implies
 >  (qL   qH) > 
1  q

H :
Clearly, the second inequality cannot be satised if  > ^: 
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1
In this appendix we prove the existence of PBE for generic values of the parameters. In
particular, we construct an equilibrium in which the high types payo¤ is equal to zero.
Although not Markovian, in our PBE the rm and the low types equilibrium continuation
payo¤s depend on the rms belief. We use the function V : [0; 1] ! R+ to denote the
rms payo¤ (as function of its belief) and the correspondence  : [0; 1] R+ to denote the
set of payo¤s of the low type. To simplify the notation, we write  (p) = z for  (p) = fzg :
We also write min (p) (max (p)) to denote the smallest (largest) element of  (p) :
For  > ^ we dene V and  as follows:
V (p) = max fH (qH) ; pL (qL)g ; (15)
 (p) =
8>><>>:
qH for p < p^
[0;qH ] for p = p^
0 for p > p^
(16)
where p^ satises H (qH) = p^L (q

L) :
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Finally, recall that if  > ^; then it is impossible to nd two contracts (xH ; qH) and
(xL; qL) that satisfy the constraints (13) and (14).
Next, we show that for generic values of  smaller than ^ there exists a pair (V;)
satisfying a number of properties.
Lemma 9 Fix the parameters (H ; L; ; v ()) : For all but at most two values of  in
0; ^
i
; there exists a pair (V;) satisfying the following conditions:
i) V is continuous and  is upper hemicontinuous;
ii) there exists p 2 (0; 1) such that V (p) = pL and  (p) = 0 for p > p;
iii) there exists p 2 [0; p] such that V (p) = H for p 6 p;  (p) = qH for p < p; and
qH 2 
 
p

;
iv) V (p) = ~V (p) for p 2 p; p ; and V (p) > ~V (p) for p 2  0; p [ (p; 1) ; where ~V (p)
is dened by
~V (p) = max
(qH ;qL)2[0;1]2;x2R;~p6p
1 p
1 ~p [(1  )H (qH) + V (~p)] +
p ~p
1 ~p [(1  ) (v (qL)  x) + L (qL)]
s.t. x  HqL    6 0
(1  ) (x  LqL   ) = (1  )qH + min (~p)
(17)
v) If min (p) < qH and v 2 [min (p) ;qH ] ; there exists p0 2 [0; p] such that
v 2  (p0) :
Proof of Lemma 9.
We develop an iterative procedure which will deliver the pair (V;) with the desired
properties.
Step 1
First, we allow the rm to propose a menu which separates the two types (with em-
ployment). Specically, for every belief p we consider the following optimization problem:
V 1 (p) := max
(qH ;qL)2[0;1]2;x2R
(1  p) [(1  )H (qH) + H (qH)] +
p [(1  ) (v (qL)  x) + L (qL)]
s.t. x  HqL    6 0
(1  ) (x  LqL   ) > (1  )qH + qH
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The rm o¤ers the contracts (HqH + ; qH) to the high type and the contract (x; qL)
to the low type. Clearly, at the optimum the low types IC constraint is binding. Thus, we
can rewrite the problem as
V 1 (p) = max
(qH ;qL)2[0;1]2;x2R
(1  p) [(1  )H (qH) + H (qH)] +
p [(1  )L (qL) + L (qL)  (1  )qH   qH ]
(18)
s.t. qH   qL + 1 qH 6 0 (19)
We let (q1H (p) ; q
1
L (p)) denote the solution to the above problem. It follows from the
concavity of the functions H and L that q1H (p) is uniquely dened for p 2 [0; 1) ; and q1L (p)
is uniquely dened for p 2 (0; 1] : Furthermore q1H () and q1L () are upper hemicontinuous
(theorem of the maximum), and V 1 () is continuous (again, theorem of the maximum)
and convex (notice that the pairs (qH ; qL) satisfying constraint (19) do not vary with p).
Finally, it immediate to check that for any p; q1H (p) 6 qH , and q1L (p) > qL, and that q1H ()
is decreasing in p:
We now distinguish among di¤erent cases.
Case 1.1. For every p 2 [0; 1] ;
V 1 (p) 6 max fH (qH) ; pL (qL)g :
In this case, we let V and  be dened as in equations (15) and (16), respectively.
Case 1.2. There exists p 2 (0; 1) such that
V 1 (p) > max fH (qH) ; pL (qL)g : (20)
Notice that
@V 1 (p)
@p
= (1  )L
 
q1L (p)

+L (q

L) (1  )q1H (p) qH (1  )H
 
q1H (p)
 H (qH)
If V 1 (p) > H (qH) it must be that
(1  )L
 
q1L (p)

+ L (q

L)  (1  )qH   qH > H (qH)
and, therefore, @V 1 (p) =@pmust be strictly positive at any point p which satises inequality
(20).
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Also, recall that V 1 is convex and V 1 (p) 6 pL (qL) for every p > pC :We conclude that
the set of beliefs for which inequality (20) holds is an interval

p
1
; p1

; with p
1
2 [0; p^) and
p1 2
 
p^; pC

:
Case 1.2.1. p
1
= 0:
In this case, q1H (0) = q

H :We point out that the case p1 = 0 can arise only if  6 1  qH
(if  > 1 qH it is impossible to nd qL such that the pair (qH ; qL) satises constraint (19)).
We claim that for generic values of ; if p
1
= 0; then
@+V
1 (0) = lim
p#0
(1  )L
 
q1L (p)

+ L (q

L) qH   H (qH)
is strictly positive.
First, for  6 1  qH=qL; q1L (p) = qL for every p > 0; and thus
@+V
1 (0) = L (q

L) qH   H (qH) = L (qL)  L (qH) > 0:
Suppose now that  2 (1  qH=qL; 1  qH ] and q1H (0) = qH : Then for each ; there exists
" such that
q1L (p) = q
1
H (p) +

1   q

H
for every p 2 [0; "] : Therefore, we have
@+V
1 (0) = (1  )L

qH
1  

+ L (q

L) qH   H (qH) :
Notice that the function g () dened by
g () = (1  )L

qH
1  

+ L (q

L) qH   H (qH)
is strictly concave and, therefore, there can be at most two distinct values of  for which
g () is equal to zero. This shows that generically, if p
1
= 0; then @+V 1 (p) > 0: In what
follows, we say that the value of  is generic if g () 6= 0:
When p
1
= 0 we dene V (; 1) and  (; 1) as follows:
V (p; 1) =
8<: V
1 (p) for p 6 p1
pL (q

L) for p > p1
 (p; 1) =
8>><>>:
(1  )q1H (p) + qH for p < p1
[0; (1  )q1H (p1) + qH ] for p = p1
0 for p > p1
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Case 1.2.2. p
1
> 0:
We claim that for every  we have @+V 1

p
1

> 0: Notice that V 1 () cannot be constant
and equal to H (qH) in the interval
h
0; p
1

: In fact, if V 1 (0) = H (qH) ; then we have
q1H (0) = q

H : This and the rms optimality condition imply that q
1
H (p) is strictly decreasing
in p in a neighborhood of zero, which, in turn, implies the strict convexity of V 1 () near
zero. Therefore, we conclude that either V 1 (0) < H (qH) or V
1 (0) = H (q

H) and V
1 ()
is strictly convex in a neighborhood of zero. In either case, V 1 () achieves a minimum at
py 2
h
0; p
1

and V 1 (py) < H (qH) = V
1

p
1

: This and the convexity of V 1 () imply
@+V
1

p
1

> 0:
In this case (p
1
> 0), we dene V (; 1) and  (; 1) as follows:
V (p; 1) =
8>>><>>>:
H (q

H) for p 6 p1
V 1 (p) for p 2

p
1
; p1

pL (q

L) for p > p1
 (p; 1) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
qH p < p1h
(1  )q1H

p
1

+ qH ;q

H
i
p = p
1
(1  )q1H (p) + qH p 2

p
1
; p1

[0; (1  )q1H (p1) + qH ] p = p1
0 p > p1
Step 2
We now consider the case of probabilistic separation. That is, the rm o¤ers two
contracts. The high type chooses the rst contract, while the low type randomizes between
the two contracts.
For every p > p
1
; we consider the following optimization problem
V 2 (p) := max
(qH ;qL)2[0;1]2;x2R;~p2[p1;minfp;p1g]
1 p
1 ~p [(1  )H (qH) + V (~p; 1)] +
p ~p
1 ~p [(1  ) (v (qL)  x) + L (qL)]
s.t. x  HqL    6 0
(1  ) (x  LqL   ) > (1  )qH + min (~p; 1)
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The second constraint must bind and we can rewrite the problems as
V 2 (p) = max
(qH ;qL)2[0;1]2;~p2[p1;minfp;p1g]
1 p
1 ~p [(1  )H (qH) + V (~p; 1)] +
p ~p
1 ~p [(1  )L (qL) + L (qL)  (1  )qH   min (~p; 1)]
(21)
s.t. (qH   qL) + 1  min (~p; 1) 6 0:
If V 2 (p) 6 V (p; 1) for every p 2 [0; 1] ; then we set V () equal to V (; 1) ; and  ()
equal to  (; 1) : On the other hand, if V 2 (p) > V (p; 1) for some p; we distinguish among
di¤erent cases.
Case 2.1. p
1
= 0
First, we assume that p
1
= 0 and consider the generic values of  for which @+V (0; 1) >
0: We show that when the belief is su¢ ciently small the rm does not benet from an
additional possibility of screening the worker.
Claim 4 Assume that p
1
= 0: There exists " > 0 such that V 2 (p) = V (p; 1) for every
p 2 [0; "] :
Proof of Claim 4.
For every p and ~p 6 p dene V 2 (p; ~p) as follows:
V 2 (p; ~p) = max
(qH ;qL)2[0;1]2
1 p
1 ~p [(1  )H (qH) + V (~p; 1)] +
p ~p
1 ~p [(1  )L (qL) + L (qL)  (1  )qH   min (~p; 1)]
(22)
s.t. (qH   qL) + 1  min (~p; 1) 6 0:
and notice that V 2 (p; 0) = V (p; 1) (recall that  (p; 1) = qH).
We show that for p close to zero, the function V 2 (p; ) is decreasing in ~p: This will prove
our claim.
We let qH (p; ~p) and qL (p; ~p) denote the solution to the above problem and let  (p; ~p)
denote the Lagrangian multiplier. From the rst order conditions with respect to qL we
have
p  ~p
1  ~p (1  )
@L (qL (p; ~p))
qL
=  (p; ~p) :
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We apply the envelope theorem and obtain18
@V 2(p;~p)
@~p
= 1 p
(1 ~p)2 [(1  )H(qH (p; ~p)) + V (~p; 1)] 
1 p
(1 ~p)2 [(1  )L(qL (p; ~p)) + L(qL)  (1  )qH (~p)  min(~p; 1)] +
1 p
1 ~p

 @V (~p;1)
@~p
 

p ~p
1 ~p

 @min(~p;1)
@~p
+  (p; ~p) 
1 
@min(~p;1)
@~p
=
1 p
(1 ~p)2 [(1  )H(qH (p; ~p)) + V (~p; 1)] 
1 p
(1 ~p)2 [(1  )L(qL (p; ~p)) + L(qL)  (1  )qH (p; ~p)  min(~p; 1)] +
1 p
1 ~p

 @V (~p;1)
@~p
 

p ~p
1 ~p

 @min(~p;1)
@~p
+  p ~p
1 ~p
@L(qL(p;~p))
qL
@min(~p;1)
@~p
Recall that we are considering the case in which p
1
= 0: Therefore, as p converges to zero
min~p6p qH (p; ~p) must converge to qH . Also, as ~p shrinks to zero, V (~p; 1) and min(~p; 1)
converge to H(qH) and q

H ; respectively, and the derivative of min(~p; 1) (with respect
to ~p) is bounded. Therefore, we have
lim
p#0
max
~p6p
@V 2(p;~p)
@~p
= H(q

H) 
h
(1  )L(max
n
qL;
qH
1 
o
) + L(q

L) qH
i
+
@+V (0; 1) =   (1  ) @+V (0; 1) < 0
where the inequality follows from our genericity assumption.
We conclude that when p
1
= 0 (and  is generic), there exists " > 0 such that for p 6 "
the function V 2(p; ) is decreasing in the interval [0; p] : Thus, for p 6 "; V 2 (p) = V 2(p; 0) =
V (p; 1) :
In general, the value of " above depends on : However, is easy to see that there exists "
such that for any (generic)  6 1 qH=qL and for any p 6 "; V 2 (p) = V 2(p; 0) = V (p; 1) : 
We dene p
2
> 0 as
p
2
= inf

p : V 2 (p) > V (p; 1)
	
We now show that the function V 2 () is convex. Clearly, the restriction of V 2 () to the
interval
h
0; p
2
i
is convex since, in this interval, V 2 () is equal to V (; 1) :
We now consider the interval
h
p
2
; 1
i
and observe that there exists  > 0 such that
V 2 (p) > V (p; 1) > H (qH) + 
18It is easy to see that the function min(; 1) is di¤erentiable in a neighborhood of zero.
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for every p 2
h
p
2
; 1
i
: Thus, for p > p
2
we have
V 2 (p; p) 6 (1  )H (qH) + V (p; 1) < V (p; 1)  (1  ) :
This, together with the continuity of V 2 (p; ~p) with respect to ~p; imply that for every
p0 > p
2
; there exists " > 0 such that for any p 2 (p0   "; p0 + ") the optimal value of ~p (in
the optimization problem (21)) is below p0   ": This means that the restriction V 2 () to
the interval (p0   "; p0 + ") is the upper envelope of a xed family of a¢ ne functions. Thus,
the function V 2 () is locally convex in [0; 1] ; and, therefore, convex.
It follows from the convexity of V 2 () that there exists a point p2 2
 
p1; p
C

such that
V 2 () < pL (qL) if p < p2; and V 2 () > pL (qL) if p > p2:
We conclude Step 2.1 by dening V (; 2) and  (; 2) as follows:
V (p; 2) =
8>>><>>>:
V (p; 1) for p 6 p
2
V 2 (p) for p 2

p
2
; p2

pL (q

L) for p > p2
(23)
 (p; 2) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
 (p; 1) p < p
2
Conv
n
(1  )q2H

p
2

+ min

~p2

p
2

; 1
o
[ 

p
2
; 1

p = p
2
(1  )q2H (p) + min (~p2 (p) ; 1) p 2

p
2
; p2

[0; (1  )q2H (p2) + min (~p2 (p) ; 1)] p = p2
0 p > p2
(24)
where q2H (p) and ~p
2 (p) denote the optimal values of qH and ~p; respectively, in the opti-
mization problem (21), and Conv () denotes the convex hull of a given set.
Case 2.2. p
1
> 0:
We distinguish between two cases.
Case 2.2.1. There exists " > 0 such that V 2 (p) = V (p; 1) for every p 2
h
p
1
; p
1
+ "
i
:
We let p
2
denote
inf

p : V 2 (p) > V (p; 1)
	
Similarly to the previous case, the function V 2 () is convex and we let p2 2
 
p1; p
C

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denote the point at which V 2 () intersects the function pL (qL) :
We dene V (; 2) and  (; 2) as in (23) and (24), respectively.
Case 2.2.2. For every " > 0; there exists p 2

p
1
; p
1
+ "

such that V 2 (p) > V (p; 1).
In this case we have V 2

p
1

= V

p
1
; 1

= H (q

H) ; q
2
H

p
1

= qH and
0 < @+V
1

p
1

< @+V
2

p
1

= lim
p#p
1
@V 2(p)
@p
=
1
1 p
1
h
(1  )L

q2L

p
1

+ L (q

L)  (1  )qH   min

p
1
; 1

  H (qH)
i
(25)
where q2L (p) denotes the optimal value of qL (given the belief p) in the optimization problem
(21).
Recall the denition of V 2 (p; ~p) in the optimization problem (21). It follows from
inequality (25) that there exists " > 0 such that V 2

p; p
1

> V (p; 1) for every p 2
p
1
; p
1
+ "

:
The function V 2

p; p
1

is convex is p: Thus, there exists p2 2
 
p1; p
C

at which the
function V 2

p; p
1

and the function pL (qL) intersect. We dene V (; 2) and  (; 2) as
follows:
V (p; 2) =
8>>><>>>:
V (p; 1) for p 6 p
1
V 2

p; p
1

for p 2

p
1
; p2

pL (q

L) for p > p2
 (p; 2) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
 (p; 1) p < p
1
Conv
n
(1  )qH

p
1
; p
1

+ min

p
1
; 1
o
[ 

p
1
; 1

p = p
1
(1  )qH

p; p
1

+ min

p
1
; 1

p 2

p
1
; p2

h
0; (1  )qH

p2; p1

+ min (p1; 1)
i
p = p2
0 p > p2
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Then for every p > p
1
; we consider the following optimization problem
V 3 (p) = max
(qH ;qL)2[0;1]2;~p2[p1;minfp;p2g]
1 p
1 ~p [(1  )H (qH) + V (~p; 1)] +
p ~p
1 ~p [(1  )L (qL) + L (qL)  (1  )qH   min (~p; 1)]
s.t. (qH   qL) + 1  min (~p; 1) 6 0:
It is easy to show that there exists " > 0 such that V 3 (p) = V (p; 2) for every p 2h
p
1
; p
1
+ "
i
(the proof of this fact is similar to the proof of Claim 4 and we omit it).
If V 3 (p) 6 V (p; 2) for every p; then we set V () equal to V (; 2) ; and  () equal to
 (; 2) : Otherwise we dene p
3
> p
1
as
p
3
= inf

p : V 3 (p) > V (p; 2)
	
;
and let p3 > p3 denote the point at which the function V
2

p; p
1

and the function pL (qL)
intersect (it is easy to show that the function V 3 () is convex).
Finally, we dene the function V (; 3) ; and  (; 3) as follows:
V (p; 3) =
8>>><>>>:
V (p; 2) for p 6 p
3
V 3 (p) for p 2

p
3
; p3

pL (q

L) for p > p2
 (p; 3) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
 (p; 2) p < p
3
Conv
n
(1  )q3H

p
3

+ min

~p

p
3

; 2
o
[ 

p
3
; 2

p = p
3
(1  )q3H (p) + min (~p3 (p) ; 2) p 2

p
3
; p3

[0; (1  )q3H (p3) + min (~p3 (p3) ; 2)] p = p3
0 p > p3
This concludes Step 2.
Step 3.
The analysis in Step 2 shows that there exists k^ = 2; 3 such that V

; k^

and V

; k^   1

coincides in the interval
h
0; p
k^
i
; p
k^
> 0; and V

p
k^
; k^

is strictly larger than H (qH) :
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We now proceed by induction. For any k = k^; k^ + 1; : : : ; we take as given the pair
(V (; k) ; (; k)) and construct the pair (V (; k + 1) ; (; k + 1)) using the same procedure
described in Step 2 (see the optimization problem (21)).
It is easy to show that for any k; the function V (; k) is increasing and convex. Also, by
construction, there exists ^ > 0 such that for any k; and any p > p
k
the following inequality
holds:
V (p; k) > H (q

H) + ^:
We use this fact to show that the iterative procedure ends after nitely many rounds.
Recall that pC is the belief above which the unique optimal mechanism with commitment
is to o¤er the menu f(LqL + ; qL)g. Therefore, pk 6 pC for any k:
Claim 5 For any k = k^; k^ + 1; : : : ;
p
k+1
  p
k
>
(1  ) ^  1  pC
2L (qL)
: (26)
Proof of Claim 5.
Fix k and consider the optimization problemwhich denes the pair (V (; k + 1) ; (; k + 1)) :
Consider p > p
k
and let ~pk+1 (p) denote the optimal value of ~p.
Suppose that inequality (26) does not hold. Thus, there exists p 2

p
k
; p
k
+
(1 )^(1 pC)
L(qL)

such that V k+1 (p) > V (p; k) : Clearly, the last inequality holds only if ~pk+1 (p) > p
k
: How-
ever, this implies the following contradiction:
V k+1 (p) 6 1 p
1 ~pk+1(p)

(1  )H (qH) + V
 
~pk+1 (p) ; k

+ p ~p
k+1(p)
1 ~pk+1(p)L (q

L) 6
1 p
1 ~pk+1(p) [(1  )H (qH) + V (p; k)] + p ~p
k+1(p)
1 ~pk+1(p)L (q

L) 6
1 p
1 p
k
[(1  )H (qH) + V (p; k)] +
p p
k
1 p
k
L (q

L) 6
[(1  )H (qH) + V (p; k)] +
p p
k
1 pC L (q

L) <
V (p; k)  (1  ) ^ + p pk
1 pC L (q

L) 6 V (p; k)
where the second inequality follows from the monotonicity of V (; k). This concludes the
proof of Claim 5. 
This shows that there exists an integer k for which the pairs (V (; k) ; (; k)) and
(V (; k + 1) ; (; k + 1)) coincide on the entire unit interval. We set (V () ; ()) equal
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to (V (; k) ; (; k)) : By construction, (V () ; ()) satises all the properties in Lemma
9
The number of iterations k necessary to get the xed point (V () ; ()) generally
depends on the value of the discount factor. However, it is immediate to verify that
there exists k such that for generic values of  in (0; 1  qH=qL] ; the number of iterations
necessary to get the xed point (V () ; ()) is bounded by k: This is because there exists
 > 0 such that for any generic value of  6 1  qH=qL; for any k; and any p > pk, we have
V (p; k) > H (q

H)+  (this, in turn, follows from the convexity of the function V (; k) and
our discussion at the end of the proof of Claim 4. 
We are now ready to conclude the proof of Proposition 1. First, we consider generic
values of  6 ^ and use the pair (V () ; ()) dened in Lemma 9 to construct the equilib-
rium strategies. We assume that p < p (the case p = p = p^ will be discussed below together
with the case  > ^).
For every p 2 [0; 1] ; we construct a set of menus m (p) :
If p < p; the set m (p) contains only the menu m (p) = f(HqH + ; qH)g : If p > p;
m (p) contains only the menu m (p) = f(LqL + ; qL)g :
Consider now p 2 p; p ; and let (qH (p) ; qL (p) ; ~p (p)) denote the solution to the opti-
mization problem (17) such that
(1  )qH (p) + min (~p (p)) = min (p)
We letm (p) denote the menus containing the contracts (xH (p) ; qH (p)) and (xL (p) ; qL (p)) ;
where the payments xH (p) and xL (p) are given by:
xH (p) = HqH (p) + 
xL (p) = LqL (p) + +qH (p) +

1  min (~p (p))
If max (p) = min (p) ; then m (p) = fm (p)g : If max (p) > min (p) and p 2 
p; p

; then we let (q0H (p) ; q
0
L (p) ; ~p
0 (p)) denote the solution to the optimization problem
(17) such that
(1  )q0H (p) + min (~p0 (p)) = max (p) (27)
We also let m0 (p) denote the menus containing the contracts (x0H (p) ; q
0
H (p)) and
48
(x0L (p) ; q
0
L (p)) ; where the payments x
0
H (p) and x
0
L (p) are given by:
x0H (p) = Hq
0
H (p) + 
x0L (p) = Lq
0
L (p) + +q
0
H (p) +

1  min (~p
0 (p)) (28)
In this case, we set m (p) = fm (p) ;m0 (p)g :
Ifmax
 
p

> min
 
p

; then we setm0 (p) = f(HqH + ; qH)g andm (p) = fm (p) ;m0 (p)g :
Finally, we consider p and set m (p) = f(LqL + ; qL)g : If max (p) = min (p) ;
then m (p) = fm (p)g : Otherwise, we set m0 (p) = f(x0H (p) ; q0H (p)) ; (x0L (p) ; q0L (p))g (see
equations (27) and (28)) and m (p) = fm (p) ;m0 (p)g :
The equilibrium strategies are described in terms of the state which consists of a belief
p 2 [0; 1] and a continuation payo¤ v 2  (p) : The initial state is (p0;min (p0)) ; where
p0 is the prior.
Consider an arbitrary public history ht and suppose the state is (p; v) : In equilibrium,
if v = min (p) ; then the rm o¤ers the menu m (p) : On the other hand, if v > min (p) ;
then the rm randomizes between the two menus in m (p) and proposes m (p) with proba-
bility  dened by
min (p) + (1  )max (p) = v:
We now turn to the workers strategy. Consider a public history ht in which the rms
belief  (ht) is equal to p: Let m = ((x1; q1) ; : : : ; (xk; qk)) denote the menu o¤ered by the
rm, and for i = H;L dene
(xi; qi) := arg max
i=1;:::;k
xi   iqi   
If xL   LqL    < 0; then both types reject all the contracts in the menu and quit the
relationship. Furthermore, if the worker accepts a contract, then the rms belief will be
equal to one (in other words, the new state will be (1; 0)).
Suppose that xL   LqL    > 0 and xH   H qH    < 0: In this case, the low type
picks the contract (xL; qL) ; while the high type quits the relationship. Again, if the worker
accepts a contract, the rms belief will be equal to one.
We now turn to the case xH   H qH    > 0; and distinguish among three di¤erent
possibilities. First, assume that the contracts (xL; qL) and (xH ; qH) are such that
(1  ) (xL   LqL   ) 6 (1  ) (xH   LqH   ) + min (p)
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In this case, both types accept the contract (xH ; qH) ; and the rms belief remains
unchanged. If the worker accepts any other contract, the rms belief will jump to one.
Second, if
(1  ) (xL   LqL   ) > (1  ) (xH   LqH   ) + qH ;
then type i = H;L accepts the contract (xi; qi) : The rms belief will become zero if the
worker accepts the contract (xH ; qH) ; and one if the worker accepts any other contract.
Finally, assume that
(1  ) [(xL   LqL)  (xH   LqH)]

2 (min (p) ;qH) ;
and thus
(1  ) (xL   LqL   ) = (1  ) (xH   LqH   ) + 
h
~min (p0) +

1  ~

max (p0)
i
for some p0 6 p and some ~ 2 [0; 1] : In this case, the high type accepts the contract
(xH ; qH) ; while the low type chooses the contract (xH ; qH) with probability
p0
1 p0
1 p
p
; and
the contract (xL; qL) with probability 1  p01 p0 1 pp : Following the acceptance of the contract
(xH ; qH) the new state will be

p0; ~min (p0) +

1  ~

max (p0)

: If the worker accepts
the contract (xL; qL) or any other contract, the rms belief will be equal to one.
It is easy to check that the above strategy prole, together with the rms belief, consti-
tute a PBE. The sequential rationality of the rms strategy follows from the construction
of the pair (V;) : In equilibrium, the high type behaves myopically and maximizes his
period-t payo¤ at any history ht. This behavior is indeed optimal since the high types
continuation payo¤ (computed at the beginning of period t + 1) is equal to zero after any
public history. Finally, notice that when the low type randomizes, all the contracts in the
strategys support yield the same expected payo¤ (and this is greater than the payo¤ of
any other contract).
We now briey turn to the case  > ^ and the case p = p = p^ (when  6 ^). Re-
call the denitions of V and  in equations (15) and (16), respectively. For every belief
p; we dene the set of menus m (p) as follows. If p < p^; the set m (p) contains only
the menu m (p) = f(HqH + ; qH)g : If p > p^; m (p) contains only the menu m (p) =
f(LqL + ; qL)g : Finally, the set m (p^) contains both the menu m (p^) = f(LqL + ; qL)g
and the menum0 (p^) = f(HqH + ; qH)g : The equilibrium strategies and beliefs are dened
similarly to the case p < p above and we omit the details. 
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Appendix C
Proof of Lemma 4.
First, notice that WH (ht) = 0 implies that almost all menus o¤ered at ht yield a
continuation payo¤ of zero to the high type. Let mt =
 
(x1t ; q
1
t ) ; : : : ;
 
xkt ; q
k
t

be a menu
o¤ered at ht: For i = H;L; let mit denote the set of contracts in mt accepted with positive
probability by the type i: If there exists a contract
 
xjt ; q
j
t

in mLt nmHt ; then ~T coincides
with t (in fact, the rms belief jumps to one if the worker accepts the contract
 
xjt ; q
j
t

)
and there is nothing to prove. Therefore, assume that mLt  mHt and recall that mLt is
non-empty.
For every contract
 
xjt ; q
j
t

in mHt , we let h
t+1
j =
 
ht;mt;
 
xjt ; q
j
t

denote the history in
which the worker accepts the contract
 
xjt ; q
j
t

in period t; and recall that WH
 
ht+1j

> 0
represents the high-workers payo¤ at ht+1j . For every contract
 
xjt ; q
j
t
 2 mHt we replace
the payment xjt with the payment
~xjt = x
j
t +

1  WH
 
ht+1j

which, clearly, implies ~xjt = Hq
j
t + :
To keep the partiespayo¤s unchanged, we also modify the payments in period t + 1:
In particular, for every
 
xjt ; q
j
t
 2 mHt consider the history ht+1j : Let mt+1 denote a menu
o¤ered at ht+1j with positive probability. We subtract
1
1 WH
 
ht+1j ;mt+1

; the high types
continuation payo¤at the moment that the menumt+1 is o¤ered, from the payment of every
contract in mt+1: Notice that this yields to the high type a continuation payo¤ (evaluated
at the beginning of period t+ 1) equal to zero.
We recursively apply the procedure outlined above to periods  = t+ 1; : : : ; ~T (i.e., we
increase the payments in period  and, at the same time, decrease the payments in period
 + 1). By construction, every contract (x ; q ) accepted with positive probability by the
high type in period  = t; : : : ; ~T  1 is replaced with the contract (Hq + ; q ), while the
payments in every menu o¤ered in period ~T are uniformly decreased by the high types
continuation payo¤. Finally, in every period  = t; : : : ; ~T  1, the set of contracts accepted
by the low type is contained in the set of contracts accepted by the high type (this follows
from the denition of ~T). It is therefore immediate to check that all the results stated in
the lemma hold. 
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Proof of Lemma 5.
Fix a PBE (; ) and a history ht ( (ht) < p) at which the rm o¤ers a menu mt with
the properties described in the statement of the lemma. First, notice that if the high type
rejects all the contracts in mt with probability one (i.e., the high type quits), then the high
types length of the relationship, the rms payo¤ (conditional on the high type), and the
low types payo¤ are all equal to zero (if the low types payo¤ is strictly positive, the rms
payo¤ would fall below  (ht)L (qL)).
Consider now the case in which the high type accepts a contract in mt, say
 
xHt ; q
H
t

,
with positive probability. We let ht+1H denote the history
 
ht;mt;
 
xHt ; q
H
t

: We also let
ht+1L denote the history
 
ht;mt;
 
xLt ; q
L
t

:
The fact that type i = H;L accepts with positive probability the contract (xit; q
i
t) implies
(1  )  xHt   HqHt   + WH  ht+1H  > (1  )  xLt   HqLt   + WH  ht+1L 
(1  )  xLt   LqLt   + WL  ht+1L  > (1  )  xHt   LqHt   + WL  ht+1H 
We add the two incentive compatibility constraints and obtain
(1  )  qLt   qHt +   WL  ht+1L  WH  ht+1L  >   WL  ht+1H  WH  ht+1H 
Recall that 
 
ht+1L

> p and that [p; 1] is a ring region. Therefore, there exist K and
 < 1 such thatWL
 
ht+1L

6 K (1  ) for  > . Of course, WH
 
ht+1L

> 0: This, together
with the above inequality, implies:
(1  )  qLt   qHt + K (1  ) >   WL  ht+1H  WH  ht+1H  (29)
We now let DH
 
ht+1H

:= E(;)
h
(1  )
XT 1
=t+1
 t 1jht+1H ; H
i
denote the expected
discounted time, computed at ht+1H ; until the high type quits. Our next goal is to provide an
upper bound to DH
 
ht+1H

: Thus, without loss, assume that DH
 
ht+1H

is strictly positive.
We let
Qt+1 =
E(;)
h
(1  )
XT 1
=t+1
 t 1q jht+1H ; H
i
DH
 
ht+1H

the expected discounted total quality provided by the high type at the history ht+1H :
Using Jensens inequality (recall that the function  () is concave), we can bound the
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rms continuation payo¤ (conditional on type H) as follows:
VF (h
t+1
H ;H) 6 E(;)
h
(1  )
XT 1
=t+1
 t 1 (q ) jht+1H ; H
i
6
E(;)
h
(1  )
XT 1
=t+1
 t 1 (Qt+1) jht+1H ; H
i
= DH
 
ht+1H

 (Qt+1)
Let qH 2 (0; qH) be such that H (qH) = 0 and notice that H (q) < 0 for every q < qH :19
This implies that Qt+1 > qH : In fact, if the last inequality is violated, then VF (ht+1H ;H) is
strictly negative, and VF (ht+1H ) is strictly less than 
 
ht+1H

L (q

L) ; contradicting Lemma
1. Notice that one strategy available to the low type is to imitate the high types behavior
(in every period). Therefore, we conclude that
WL
 
ht+1H
 WH  ht+1H  > DH  ht+1H Qt+1 > DH  ht+1H  qH
Combining the inequality above with inequality (29) we obtain
DH
 
ht+1H

6
(1  )  qLt   qHt 
qH
+
K (1  )
qH
6 (1  )
qH

1 +
K


:
Hence, for  > 1
2
we have
DH
 
ht+1H

6 2 (1  )
qH

1 +
K


This, in turn, implies that (for  > 1
2
)
E(;)
h
(1  )
XT 1
=t
 tjht;mt; H
i
6 (1  ) +DH
 
ht+1H

6
1 + 2
qH
+ 2
K
qH

(1  ) := ~K (1  )
and establishes part i).
To verify property ii), notice that the inequality above implies that the rms continu-
ation payo¤ VF (ht;mt; (; ) ; H) is bounded above by v (1) ~K (1  ) :
Finally, we turn to property iii). The analysis above implies that
VF (h
t;mt) 6 
 
ht
 
L (q

L) WL
 
ht;mt

+ v (1) ~K (1  ) (30)
19This part of the proof uses the assumption  > 0 to bound qH away from zero. In Appendix D, we
provide a di¤erent argument which does not require qH > 0:
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Let 0 be such that
v (1) ~K (1  0) = H (q

H)
4
and notice that for  > ~ = max

0; ; 1
2
	
and  (ht) 6 H(q

H)
2L(qL)

 
ht

L (q

L) + v (1)
~K (1  ) 6 3
4
H (q

H)
It follows that if the rm o¤ers the menu mt at the history ht and  > ~; then
 (ht) >
H(qH)
2L(qL)
: Finally, recall that VF (ht;mt) is bounded below by  (ht)L (qL) : This
and inequality (30) imply
WL
 
ht;mt

6 v (1)
 (ht)
~K (1  ) 6 2L (q

L) v (1)
~K
H (qH)
(1  )
This shows that there exists K > 0 satisfying the three properties in Lemma 5. 
Proof of Claim 3.
First, assume that ~q0 6 qH2 and notice that H (~q0) < H
 
qH
2

< 0 (recall that qH 2
(0; qH) satises H (qH) = 0). Also, notice that p^ < p0 < p: If inequality (5) is satised,
then we have
0 6

1  p0
p

0H (~q0) +
p0
p
[pH (~qp) + (1 p) pL (qL)] +K (1  )  p0L (qL) 6
1  p0
p

0H
 
qH
2

+ p0
p
p [H (q

H)  pL (qL)] +K (1  ) 6
1  p0
p

0H
 
qH
2

+K (1  )
Putting together this and p0 < pC we obtain
1
1  p0

1  p0
p

0 6   K (1  )
(1  pC)H
 
qH
2
 (31)
Similarly, we obtain
0 6

1  p0
p

0H (~q0) +
p0
p
[pH (~qp) + (1 p) pL (qL)] +K (1  )  p0L (qL) 6
1  p0
p

0H (~q0) +
p0
p
p [H (q

H)  pL (qL)] +K (1  ) 6
p0
p
p [H (q

H)  pL (qL)] +K (1  ) 6
1  f(p)
2p

p [H (q

H)  pL (qL)] +K (1  )
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where the last inequality follows from p0 2
h
p  f(p)
2
; p
i
and H (qH)  pL (qL) < 0:
Hence, we have:
1  p
1  p0

p0
p

p 6 p 6
K (1  )
1  f(p)
2p

[pL (qL)  H (qH)]
(32)
For the case ~q0 6 qH2 , inequalities (31) and (32) imply the result.
We now move to the case ~q0 >
qH
2
: It follows from the concavity of H () that H (~q0) 6
H (0) + 
0
H (0) ~q0 6 0H (0) ~q0: Also, H (~qp) < H (qH) for any ~qp 6= qH : Thus, we have
1  p0
p

0H (~q0) +
p0
p
[pH (~qp) + (1 p) pL (qL)] +K (1  ) 6
1  p0
p

0
0
H (0) ~q0 +
p0
p
[pH (q

H) + (1 p) pL (qL)] +K (1  )
(33)
Suppose that inequality (6) holds. Clearly, the inequality continues to hold if we replace
~qp with one. This allows us to conclude that ~q0; 0; and p must satisfy
0~q0 6 p +
2K (1  )


1
1 p0

1  p0
p
 (34)
Combining inequalities (33) and (34) we obtain (recall that p0 > p^):
1  p0
p

0H (~q0) +
p0
p
[pH (~qp) + (1 p) pL (qL)] +K (1  ) 6
1  p0
p

0H (0)p +
p0
p
[pH (q

H) + (1 p) pL (qL)] +K

1 +
20H(0)(1 p^)


(1  )
We dene K1 :=

1 +
20H(0)(1 p^)


: It follows from inequality (5) and the inequality
above that
p0L(q

L) 6

1  p0
p

0H (0)p +
p0
p
[pH (q

H) + (1 p) pL (qL)] +K1 (1  )
which leads to:
0 6 p
h
1  p0
p

0H (0) +
p0
p
[H (q

H)  pL (qL)]
i
+K1(1  ) 6
p

1  p 
f(p)
2
p

0H (0) +
p  f(p)
2
p
[H (q

H)  pL (qL)]

+K1(1  )
(35)
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The second inequality holds because the expression

1  p0
p

0H (0)+
p0
p
[H (q

H)  pL (qL)]
is a¢ ne in p0 and is negative for p0 = p and equal to zero for p0 = p f (p) (see the denition
of the function f () in equation (2)). Also, recall that p0 2
h
p  f(p)
2
; p
i
:
From inequality (35) we obtain:
p 6
K1
p  f(p)
2

L (qL) 

f(p)
2p

0H (0) 

1  f(p)
2p

H (qH)
(1  ) := K2(1  )
and, thus, 
1  p
1  p0

p0
p

p 6 p 6 K2(1  ) (36)
Finally, using (34) and (36) and p0 < pC we have:
1
1 p0

1  p0
p

0~q0 6

1
1 pC

1  p0
p

p +
2K(1 )

6
1
1 pC

p +
2K(1 )

6

1
1 pC

K2(1  ) + 2K(1 )
Recall that ~q0 >
qH
2
: It follows from the last inequality that
1
1  p0

1  p0
p

0 6

2
qH

K2
1  pC +
2K


(1  )
which coupled with (36) implies the result. 
Proof of Lemma 7.
Fix a PBE (; ) and a history ht as described in the statement of the lemma. The
rms continuation payo¤ after o¤ering the menu mt is equal to
VF (h
t;mt) =
 
1    htVF (ht;mt;H) +   htVF (ht;mt;L)
Recall from Lemma 6 that [p^+ "; 1] is a ring region. Therefore, it follows from Lemma
5 that there exist K and  > 1  "L(q

L)
2 K
such that  >  implies
VF (h
t;mt;H) 6 K (1  )
Then it follows from the last inequality that
VF (h
t;mt) 6 (p^  ")L (qL) + K (1  ) <

p^  "
2

L (q

L) < H (q

H)
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contradicting Lemma 1. 
Proof of Part II of Proposition 2.
We start with the proof of the rst property. By contradiction, suppose that there exists
a sequence fn; (n; n)g1n=1 such that n converges to one, (n; n) is a PBE of the game
with discount factor equal to n; and
lim
n!1
E(n;n)

Tn

=  > 0 (37)
Without loss of generality, we assume that WH (h0; (n; n)) = 0 for every n:
Let k :=
j
2
1 p^
k
; and for k = k; k + 1; : : : ; let ~Tk 6 1 be the random time that stops
the play at the rst history

h
~T;m~T

at which the menu m~T contains a contract (x~T; q~T)
accepted with positive probability and for which 

h
~T;m~T; (x~T; q~T)

> p^+ 1
k
: As usual, we
set ~Tk=1 if the event does not occur in nite time.
It follows from Lemma 5 that for every k > k there exist n1k 2 N and K1k such that for
every n > n1k the PBE (n; n) satises the following property. If the rm o¤ers a menu
with a contract that is accepted with positive probability and leads to a belief weakly larger
than p^+ 1
k
; then the expected discounted time until the high type quits the relationship is
bounded above by K1k (1  n) : Thus, for n > n1k we have:E(n;n) Tn  E(n;n) hIf~Tk<1g 1  n h~Tk ~Tkn i 6 K1k (1  n) (38)
Next recall that

p^+ 1
k

is a ring region and Lemma 5 (property ii) provides an upper
bound to the rms continuation payo¤ when it o¤ers a menu with a contract the leads to
a ring region. Therefore, for every k > k there exist n2k 2 N and K2k such that for every
n > n2k the rms equilibrium payo¤ is bounded as follows:
VF (h
0; (n; n)) 6 E(n;n)
24If~Tk<1g
24(1  n) ~Tk 1X
t=0
tnH (qt) + 
~Tk
n n

h
~Tk

L (q

L)
35+
If~Tk=1g (1  n)
~Tk 1X
t=0
tnH (qt)
35+K2k (1  n)
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Notice that when ~Tk<1; the belief n

h
~Tk

is, by denition, smaller than p^+ 1
k
; and,
therefore, we have:
n

h
~Tk

L (q

L) <

p^+
1
k

L (q

L) = H (q

H) +
1
k
L (q

L)
Combining the last two inequalities, for every n > n2k we obtain:
VF (h
0; (n; n)) 6 E(n;n)
24If~Tk<1g
24(1  n) ~Tk 1X
t=0
tnH (qt) + 
~Tk
n H (q

H)
35+
If~Tk=1g (1  n)
~Tk 1X
t=0
tnH (qt)
35+K2k (1  n) + 1kL (qL) =
H (q

H)  E(n;n)
24(1  n) ~Tk 1X
t=0
tn [H (q

H)  H (qt)]
35+K2k (1  n) + 1kL (qL)
This and the fact that the rms payo¤is bounded below by H (qH) lead to the following
result. For every k > k;
lim sup
n!1
E(n;n)
24(1  n) ~Tk 1X
t=0
tn [H (q

H)  H (qt)]
35 6 1
k
L (q

L) (39)
Inequality (39) implies that for every  > 0 there exists k 2 N such that for every
k > k there exists n^k 2 N such that for n > n^k we have
E(n;n)
24(1  n) ~Tk 1X
t=0
tn jqH   qtj
35 6  (40)
Furthermore, k and n^k are such that for every k > k and every n > n^k

1  p^    6 E(n;n)
h
If~Tk<1g
~Tk
n
i
6 
1  p^ + 
The above result is a consequence of equality (37), inequality (38), and Lemma 7.
Fix " 2

0;
qH
4(1 p^)(1+qH)

p^
p0
  1 p^
1 p0

: Recall that for every k; the interval

p^+ 1
k
; 1

is a ring region and Lemma 5 (property iii) provides an upper bound to the low types
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continuation payo¤ when the rms menu contains a contract that leads to a ring region.
Finally, recall that if a history ht is reached with probability Pr (ht) under (n; n) ; then
that history is reached with probability
n(ht)
p0
Pr (ht) if the worker behaves according to
Ln ; and with probability
(1 n(ht))
(1 p0) Pr (h
t) if the worker behaves according to Hn :
Putting together these observations and the last three inequalities we conclude that
there exist ~k and ~n such that for every n > ~n the low type obtains a payo¤ of at most
qH

1  E(n;n)
h

~T~k
n jLn
i
+ " 6 qH

1  p^
p0

1  p^ + "

+ "
when he behaves according to Ln ; and a payo¤ of at least
qH

1  E(n;n)
h

~T~k
n jHn
i
  " > qH

1  1  p^
1  p0

1  p^   "

  "
when he behaves according to Hn :
Notice that
qH

1  1 p^
1 p0

1 p^   "

  " qH

1  p^
p0

1 p^ + "

  " =
qH

1 p^

p^
p0
  1 p^
1 p0

  2" (1 + qH) > 0
which implies that for n su¢ ciently large the low type has an incentive to deviate and
follow Hn instead of the equilibrium strategy 
L
n :
Notice that property ii) in Part II of Proposition 2 follows directly from part i) and
inequality (40).
Finally, we turn to part iii). Assume, towards a contradiction, that there exists a
sequence fn; (n; n)g such that n converges to one and
lim
n!1
E(n;n)
"
(1  n)
T 1X
t=0
tn (xt   HqH   ) ji
#
= ~ > 0
for some i 2 fH;Lg : Using part i) and part ii) it is immediate to conclude that
lim sup
n!1
VF (h
0; (n; n)) 6 H (qH) min fp0; 1  p0g ~ < H (qH)
which leads to a contradiction and concludes the proof. 
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Appendix D: The case  = 0
In this appendix, we illustrate the changes needed in the proofs above to accommodate the
case that  = 0: First, we slightly modify the notion of ring region and replace Denition
2 with the following denition.
Denition 3 The interval [p; 1] is a ring region if there exists a function % : (0; 1]! R++
with lim!1 % () = 0 satisfying the following property. Let (; ) be an arbitrary PBE of
the game with discount factor  and consider a history ht at which  (ht) > p: Then we
have:
i) E(;)
h
(1  )
XT 1
=t
 tjht; H
i
; the expected discounted time until the high type quits
the relationship, is bounded by % () :
ii) VF (ht; (; ) ; H); the rms continuation payo¤ at the history ht conditional on type
H; is bounded by % () ;
iii) WL (ht; (; )) ; the low types continuation payo¤ at the history ht; is bounded by
% () :
Notice that the interval

pC ; 1

is a ring region. Lemma 5 should be replaced with
Lemma 10.
Lemma 10 Suppose that [p; 1] is a ring region. There exists a function  : (0; 1]! R++
with lim!1  () = 0 satisfying the following property. Let (; ) be an arbitrary PBE of the
game with discount factor ; and consider a history ht with  (ht) < p: Suppose that at ht
the rm o¤ers a menu mt containing a contract
 
xLt ; q
L
t

accepted with positive probability
and for which

 
ht;mt;
 
xLt ; q
L
t

> p
Then we have:
i) E(;)
h
(1  )
XT 1
=t
 tjht;mt; H
i
; the expected discounted time until the high type
quits the relationship, is bounded by  () ;
ii) VF (ht;mt; (; ) ; H); the rms continuation payo¤ at the history (ht;mt) conditional
on type H; is bounded by  () ;
iii) WL (ht;mt; (; )) ; the low types continuation payo¤ at the history (ht;mt) ; is
bounded by  () :
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Proof of Lemma 10.
Fix a PBE (; ) and a history ht ( (ht) < p) at which the rm o¤ers a menu mt
with the properties described in the statement of the lemma. First, notice that if the
high type rejects all the contracts in mt with probability one (i.e., the high type quits),
then the expected length of the relationship and the rms payo¤ (conditional on the high
type) are both equal to zero, while the low types continuation payo¤ is bounded above by
 (1  ) :
Consider now the case in which the high type accepts a contract in mt, say
 
xHt ; q
H
t

,
with positive probability. We let ht+1H denote the history
 
ht;mt;
 
xHt ; q
H
t

: We also let
ht+1L denote the history
 
ht;mt;
 
xLt ; q
L
t

:
The fact that type i = H;L accepts with positive probability the contract (xit; q
i
t) implies
(1  )  xHt   HqHt   + WH  ht+1H  > (1  )  xLt   HqLt   + WH  ht+1L 
(1  )  xLt   LqLt   + WL  ht+1L  > (1  )  xHt   LqHt   + WL  ht+1H 
We add the two incentive compatibility constraints and obtain
(1  )  qLt   qHt +   WL  ht+1L  WH  ht+1L  >   WL  ht+1H  WH  ht+1H 
Recall that 
 
ht+1L

> p and that [p; 1] is a ring region. Therefore, there exists a
function % () such that WL
 
ht+1L

6 % (). Of course, WH
 
ht+1L

> 0: This, together with
the above inequality, implies:
(1  ) + % ()

>
(1  )  qLt   qHt + % ()

>
 
WL
 
ht+1H
 WH  ht+1H 
Recall that a strategy available to the low type is to imitate, in every period, the high
type. Therefore, we have
WL
 
ht+1H

> WH
 
ht+1H

+E(;)
"
(1  )
T 1X
=t+1
 t 1q jht+1H ; H
#
where T denotes the random time in which the worker quits the relationship.
Combining the last two inequalities, we obtain
E(;)
"
(1  )
T 1X
=t+1
 t 1q jht+1H ; H
#
6 (1  ) + % ()

(41)
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We can now prove part i) of Lemma 10. Inequality (41) together with Claim 6 below
show the existence of a function  : (0; 1] ! R++; with lim!1  () = 0; satisfying the
condition in part i).
Claim 6 Consider a sequence of discount factors fng1n=1 converging to one. For each
n = 1; 2; : : : ; let (n; n) be a PBE of the game with discount factor n; and let h
t
n be a
history of the game.20 If
lim
n!1
E(n;n)
"
(1  n)
T 1X
=t
 tn q jhtn; H
#
= 0 (42)
then
lim
n!1
E(n;n)
"
(1  n)
T 1X
=t
 tn jhtn; H
#
= 0 (43)
Proof of Claim 6.
Assume, towards a contradiction, that there exist " > 0 and a sequence fn; (n; n) ; htng1n=1
with fng converging to one, and for which equality (42) holds and
E(n;n)
"
(1  n)
T 1X
=t
 tn jhtn; H
#
> " (44)
for every n:
Fact 2 We assume, without loss of generality, that n (htn) < p
C for any n:
Recall that under any PBE (n; n) ; if n (h
t
n) > pC ; then the high type rejects all the
contracts in the rms menu with probability one.
Fact 3 If n (htn) 6
H(qH)
2L(qL)
; then
E(n;n)
"
(1  n)
T 1X
=t
 tn q jhtn; H
#
> H (q

H)
20H (0)
20Notice that the length of the history htn may vary with n: However, to ease the notation, we do not
index the length t by n: This does not cause any confusion.
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By contradiction, suppose that the inequality above is violated. It follows from the
concavity of H () that
VF (h
t
n; (n; n)) 6 n (htn)L (qL) + (1  n (htn))E(n;n)
"
(1  n)
T 1X
=t
 tn q jhtn; H
#
0H (0) <
n (h
t
n)L (q

L) + (1  n (htn))
H(qH)
2
6 H (qH)
which contradicts Lemma 1.
Fact 4 There exists n such that for n > n; n (htn) 2

H(qH)
2L(qL)
; pC

:
It follows immediately from the rst two facts and equality (42).
Fact 5 We have
lim
n!1
E(n;n)
"
(1  n)
T 1X
=t
 tn jq   qLj jhtn; L
#
= 0
Taking a subsequence if necessary, assume, towards a contradiction, that the limit above
exists and is di¤erent from zero. Then it follows that
lim sup
n!1
E(n;n)
"
(1  n)
T 1X
=t
 tn (v (q )  x ) jhtn; L
#
< L (q

L)
Notice that equality (42) implies
lim sup
n!1
E(n;n)
"
(1  n)
T 1X
=t
 tn (v (q )  x ) jhtn; H
#
6 0
Putting together the last two inequalities, we obtain that for n su¢ ciently large
VF (h
t
n; (n; n)) < n
 
htn

L (q

L)
which contradicts Lemma 1.
We can now conclude the proof of the claim. Let Tn
 
"
2

be the smallest positive integer
such that 
Tn( "2)
n 6 1   "4 and take n 2 N such that n > n implies 
Tn( "2)
n > 1   "2 :
Inequality (44) implies that for every n > n
P(n;n)
h
T >t+ Tn
"
2

jhtn; H
i
> "
4
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Also, given equality (42), we can take n > n such that n > n implies
P(n;n)
264T >t+ Tn "
2

and (1  n)
t+Tn( "2)X
=t
 tn q <
"
8
qL jhtn; H
375 > "
8
Finally, if follows from equality (42) and from Facts 3 and 4 that there exists n > n
such that for n > n we have
P(n;n)
264T >t+ Tn   "2 and (1  n) t+Tn(
"
2)X
=t
 tn q <
"
8
qL and n

h
t+Tn( "2)
n

6 H(q

H)
2L(qL)
jhtn; H
375 > "16
This means that for every n > n there exists a subset of histories ht+Tn(
"
2)
n which,
conditional on type H; are reached with probability of at least "
16
and at which the rms
belief is at most
H(qH)
2L(qL)
: It follows from Fact 3 that for every history h
t+Tn( "2)
n with
n

h
t+Tn( "2)
n

6 H(q

H)
2L(qL)
, we have
E(n;n)
264(1  n) T 1X
=t+Tn( "2)
 tn q jh
t+Tn( "2)
n ; H
375 > H (qH)
20H (0)
which, in turn, implies
E(n;n)
"
(1  n)
T 1X
=t
 tn q jhtn; H
#
> "
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H (q

H)
0H (0)
for every n > n; contradicting equality (42). 
To verify part ii) of Lemma 10 notice that
VF (h
t;mt; (; ) ; H) 6 v (1)E(;)
"
(1  )
T 1X
=t
 tjht;mt; H
#
Therefore, it follows from part i) that there exists a function ~ : (0; 1] ! R++; with
lim!1 ~ () = 0 such that
VF
 
ht;mt; (; ) ; H

6 ~ ()
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To establish part iii), notice that it follows from the above inequality that
H (q

H) 6 VF
 
ht;mt; (; ) ; H

6
 
1    ht ~ () +   ht L (qL)
We take 1 < 1 such that  > 1 implies ~ () <
H(qH)L(qL)
2L(qL) H(qH)
: Therefore, for  > 1
the last inequality implies  (ht) > H(q

H)
2L(qL)
:
Recall that the rms payo¤ at ht is bounded below by  (ht)L (qL) : Thus, we have
 (ht)L (q

L) 6 VF (ht;mt; (; ) ; H) 6 (1   (ht)) ~ () +  (ht) [L (qL) WL (ht;mt; (; ) ; H)] 6
1  H(q

H)
2L(qL)

~ () +  (ht) [L (q

L) WL (ht;mt; (; ) ; H)]
We conclude that for  > 1
WL
 
ht;mt; (; ) ; H

6 1
 (ht)

1  H (q

H)
2L (qL)

~ () 6

2L (q

L)
H (qH)

1  H (q

H)
2L (qL)

~ ()
establishing part iii). 
Next, we explain how to modify the proof of Claim 2. First, we replace the linear bound
K1 (1  ) used in Claim 2 (see inequality (3)) with a bound  () (satisfying lim!1  () =
0). Proceeding exactly as in the proof of Claim 2, we conclude that the rms payo¤VF (h0)
is bounded above by
1  p0
p

(0)H (~q0) +
p0
p
[ (p)H (~qp) + (1 (p)) pL (qL)] +  () ; (45)
and the following incentive compatibility constraint must be satised.
(p) ~qp +  () >

1  p
1  p0

p0
p

(p) ~qp +

1
1  p0

1  p0
p

(0) ~q0: (46)
It follows from the concavity of H () that H (~q0) 6 0H (0) ~q0: Also, by replacing
H (~qp) with H (qH) in (45), and ~qp with one in (46) we conclude that
VF
 
h0

6

1  p0
p

0H (0) (0) ~q0+
p0
p
[ (p)H (q

H) + (1 (p)) pL (qL)]+ () (47)
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and ~q0; (0) ; and (p) must satisfy
(p) > (0) ~q0    ()

h
1 

1 p
1 p0

p0
p
i
Recall that lim!1  () = 0 and that p0 > p   f(p)2 > p^: This implies that as  goes
to one, both (0) ~q0 and must (p) shrink to zero. In fact, if (0) ~q0 remains bounded
away from zero (as  goes to one), then it follows from the last two inequalities that
for  su¢ ciently large VF (h0) is strictly smaller than p0L (qL) ; contradicting Lemma 1.
Similarly, if (0) ~q0 goes to zero and (p) remains bounded away from zero, then it follows
from inequality (47) that for  su¢ ciently large VF (h0) is strictly smaller than p0L (qL) :
Clearly, if both (0) ~q0 and (p) converge to zero as  goes to one, then we have:
lim
!1
E(;)
"
(1  )
T 1X
t=0
tqt j h0; H
#
= 0
We then apply Claim 6 to conclude that
lim
!1
E(;)
"
(1  )
T 1X
t=0
t j h0; H
#
= 0
This shows that there exists a function  () with lim!1  () = 0 such that
E(;)
"
(1  )
T 1X
t=0
t j h0; H
#
6  ()
Next, notice that
VF (h
0;H) 6 v (1)E(;)
"
(1  )
T 1X
t=0
tjh0; H
#
6 v (1)  ()
Also, the argument in the proof of Claim 2 shows that
WL
 
h0

6 1  p0
p0
VF (h
0;H) <
1  p^
p^
VF (h
0;H) 

1  p^
p^

v (1)  () ;
delivering the desired result.
Finally, we remark that the proof of part II) of Theorem 2 works in the same way if one
replaces the respective linear bounds K (1  ) with functions  () satisfying lim!1  () =
0:
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Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 3
We now describe a strategy prole and a system of beliefs which yield the payo¤s (VF;H ; VF;L;WH ;WL)
(we divide the description into di¤erent phases). Then we show that unilateral deviations
are not protable when the discount factor  is su¢ ciently large.
Screening Phase: In the rst period, the rm o¤ers the menu f(xH ; qH) ; (xL; qL)g
(recall that (xi; qi) ; i = H;L; is a contract yielding the payo¤VF;i to the rm and the payo¤
Wi to type i). If both contracts are rejected, the rm does not update its belief and insists
on the same menu until a contract (xi; qi) ; i = H;L; is accepted. In this case, the rms
belief assigns probability one to type i. Furthermore, the rm does not revise its belief in
future periods and the continuation equilibrium consistent with the automaton described
below starting at the state (i; 0) follows.
Suppose that during the screening phase the rm deviates and o¤ers a menum di¤erent
from f(xH ; qH) ; (xL; qL)g : Let (x (m) ; q (m)) 2 m denote the optimal contract for the
high type in m: Formally:
x (m)  Hq (m)   > xj   Hqj   
for all (xj; qj) 2 m:21
If x (m) <  + H + v (1) ; every type of the worker rejects all the contracts and
the screening phase continues in the next period with the rm insisting on the menu
f(xL; qL) ; (xH ; qH)g : If any contract (xk; qk) 2 m is selected, the rms belief assigns prob-
ability one to the low type and the continuation equilibrium consistent with the automaton
described below starting at the state (L; 2) follows.
If x (m) > +H+v (1) ; every type of the worker accepts the contract (x (m) ; q (m))
and the screening phase continues in the next period. If any other contract (xk; qk) 2 m is
accepted or if all the contracts are rejected, the rms belief assigns probability one to the
low type and the continuation equilibrium consistent with the automaton described below
starting at the state (L; 2) follows.
Post-Screening Phase: According to the description above, a post-screening phase
can be reached in a state (i; r) 2 fH;Lg f0; 1; 2g : The transition function among the
states and the action prescription for the rm and for type i = H;L in state (i; r) are the
21If there are several optimal contracts for type H; we select the contract with the smallest index.
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same as the ones in the automaton for type i presented in Section 2. The action prescription
for type j 6= i in a state (i; r) are dened below.
Actions of type L in the state (H; 0): If the rm o¤ers the menu f(xH ; qH)g ; the
low type accepts (xH ; qH) : If the rm deviates and o¤ers a di¤erent menu, then type L
accepts the contract that yields the largest current payo¤, provided that this is positive (if
it is negative, the worker rejects all the contracts).22
Actions of type L in the state (H; 1): If the rm o¤ers the menu f(xH ; qH)g ; the
low type accepts (xH ; qH) : Consider a deviation by the rm. The low type rejects all the
contracts (x; q) with x < v (1) + : Among the remaining contracts, the low type selects
the contract which yields the largest current payo¤, provided that this is positive (if it is
negative, the worker rejects all the contracts).
Actions of type L in the state (H; 2): If the rm o¤ers the menu f(xH ; qH)g ; the
low type accepts (xH ; q

H). If the rm deviates and o¤ers a di¤erent menu, then type L
accepts the contract that yields the largest current payo¤, provided that this is positive
Actions of type H in the state (L; 0): If the rm o¤ers the menu f(xL; qL)g ; the
high type accepts (xL; qL) if and only if xL   HqL    > 0. If the rm deviates and o¤ers
a di¤erent menu, then type H accepts the contract that yields the largest current payo¤,
provided that this is positive (if it is negative, the worker rejects all the contracts).
Actions of type H in the state (L; 1): We distinguish between two cases. First,
assume that xL   HqL    > 0: In this case, if the rm o¤ers the menu f(xL; qL)g ; the
high type accepts (xL; qL) : Consider a deviation by the rm. The high type rejects all the
contracts (x; q) with x < v (1) + : Among the remaining contracts, the high type selects
the contract which yields the largest current payo¤, provided that this is positive.
Suppose now that xL   HqL    6 0: In this case, the high type selects the contract
which yields the largest current payo¤, provided that this is positive.
Actions of type H in the state (L; 2): If the rm o¤ers the menu f(xL; qL)g ; the high
type accepts (xL; q

L) provided that it yields a positive current payo¤. If the rm deviates
and o¤ers a di¤erent menu, then type H accepts the contract that yields the largest current
payo¤, provided that this is positive.
Optimality of the Proposed Strategies. We now analyze the parties incentives
and show deviations are not protable for  su¢ ciently large. Let ht be an arbitrary history
22As usual, the worker selects the contract with the smallest index among those who yield the largest
current payo¤.
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in the screening phase. We let VF (S) denote the rms continuation payo¤at ht (the payo¤
is computed before the rm o¤ers the menu). Recall that the rms belief at ht is equal to
the prior p0: We also let Wi (S) ; i = H;L; denote the continuation payo¤ of type i at ht:
We have:
VF (S) = (1  p0)VF;H + p0VF;L WL (S) =WL WH (S) =WH
We now turn to the post-screening phase. For i 2 fH;Lg and r 2 f0; 1; 2g ; let VF (i; r)
and Wi (i; r) denote the rm and type is continuation payo¤, respectively, in the state
(i; r).23 These payo¤s are equal to:
VF (0; H) = VF;H VF (0; L) = VF;L WH (0; H) =WH WL (0; L) =WL
VF (1; H) =
"
2
VF (1; L) =
"
2
WH (1; H) = H (q

H)  "2 WL (1; L) = L (qL)  "2
VF (2; H) = H (q

H)  "2 VF (2; L) = L (qL)  "2 WH (2; H) = "2 WL (2; L) = "2
Next, we specify the continuation payo¤ of type i = H;L in the state (j; r) ; j 6= i and
r 2 f0; 1; 2g : We have:
WL (0; H) =WH +qH WH (0; L) = max fWL  qL; 0g
WL (1; H) = H (q

H) + q

H   "2 WH (1; L) = max

L (q

L) qL   "2 ; 0
	
WL (2; H) = q

H +
"
2
WH (2; L) = max
 qL + "2 ; 0	
To show that unilateral deviations from the proposed strategy prole are not protable,
it is enough to verify that nitely many inequalities are satised. Given the payo¤s above,
it is immediate to check that for every inequality, there is a critical value of  above which
the inequality is satised. Since the number of inequalities is nite, we conclude that there
exists y 2 (0; 1) such that for  > y no unilateral deviation is protable.
Belief Update. It is straightforward to check that, after each menu posted by the
rm, the proposed system of beliefs satises Bayess rule after each choice that is taken by
the worker with positive probability.
We conclude that the strategy prole and the system of beliefs presented above consti-
tute a PBE when  > y. 
23The action prescription for type i in the state (i; r) is specied in Section 2.
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